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  INTRODUCTION   
Ready or not, securities crowdfunding is about to go live.1 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 20122 
amended federal securities law to allow entrepreneurs to sell 
up to $1 million in unregistered securities to the public over the 
Internet.3 No longer will an entrepreneur be stymied by a lack 
 
 1. The federal statute authorizing crowdfunding was signed into law by 
President Obama in April 2012 and directed the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to issue final regulations by the end of that year. 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 
306, 320 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). The SEC adopted final rules on 
crowdfunding in October 2015. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC 
Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/pressrelease/2015-249.html. The new crowdfunding rules are set to be-
come effective 180 days after publication in the Federal Register, so the first 
crowdfunding offerings will likely commence in 2016. JD Alois, Final Crowd-
funding Rules Under Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012, CROWDFUND INSIDER 
(Oct. 31, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/ 76637-
final-crowdfunding-rules-under-title-iii-of-the-jobs-act-of-2012/. 
 2. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 126 Stat. at 306 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)). 
 3. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1457, 1458 & n.2 (2013). 
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of personal wealth or connections (or proximity to Silicon Val-
ley). Once crowdfunding4 begins, anybody with a startup5 will 
be able to go online and offer a piece of the action to the Ameri-
can people.6 And the community of investors—coined here as 
―digital shareholders‖7—will be inclusive and diverse as well. 
Through crowdfunding, people of modest means will for the 
first time be legally authorized to invest in startups that are 
currently offered exclusively to wealthy ―accredited‖ investors.8 
This is a compelling vision, one endorsed by a bipartisan 
Congress and echoed by a diverse group of states as well as for-
eign countries.9 ―For the first time,‖ said President Obama 
when he signed the JOBS Act, ―ordinary Americans will be able 
to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.‖10 
But can crowdfunding really live up to this sort of rhetoric? 
 
 4. The term ―crowdfunding‖ has a variety of uses in the field of securities 
law. In this Article it is used to refer to financing a business, especially a 
startup, pursuant to Title III of the federal JOBS Act of 2012 or analogous leg-
islation. See id. at 1458. 
 5. Crowdfunding is not legally limited to startup companies; other small 
businesses can avail themselves as well. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural 
Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 283, 293 (2013) (discussing crowdfund-
ing as a way for farms to raise capital). The thrust of the legislation, however, 
is to assist startups, as is apparent from the fact that JOBS stands for 
―Jumpstart Our Business Startups.‖ 
 6. Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act 
Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/ 
04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing (―Because of this bill, start-ups 
and small business will now have access to a big, new pool of potential inves-
tors—namely, the American people.‖). 
 7. The term ―digital shareholder‖ is new and meant to refer to any 
crowdfunding investor, not just those who are ―shareholders‖ in the literal 
sense of holding common stock. A person who buys a bond or any other crowd-
funded security is a digital shareholder as the term is coined here. 
 8. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013) (explaining how the average investor is limited 
to buying public securities while the wealthy accredited investor also has ac-
cess to private markets). 
 9. As of February 2015, thirteen states and thirty countries had enacted 
crowdfunding regimes. Steven Davidoff Solomon, S.E.C.’s Delay on Rules for 
Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at B11; EUROPE-
AN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK, ECN REVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING REGULATION 
2014 (Dec. 2014), http://www.eurocrowd.org/2014/12/ecn-review 
-crowdfunding-regulation-2014; see also Robert H. Steinhoff, The Next British 
Invasion Is Securities Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities 
Through the Crowd Can Succeed in the United States, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 
661, 690–713 (2015) (describing crowdfunding in the United Kingdom). 
 10. Press Release, White House, supra note 6; accord 2015 Colo. Sess. 
Laws 279–80 (declaring that crowdfunding will ―democratize venture capital 
formation‖). 
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Many legal scholars think crowdfunding will fail and have 
made a sport of tallying reasons why: fraud,11 costs,12 dilu-
tion,13 adverse selection,14 opportunism,15 and more.16 
This Article is different. Rather than hurling another 
stone, this Article charts a positive course for crowdfunding to 
succeed; a course based on first principles of entrepreneurial 
finance. As Professor Ronald Gilson and others have estab-
lished, there are three fundamental problems that all systems 
of startup finance must confront and overcome: (1) Uncertainty: 
it is impossible to predict how a startup will perform; (2) Infor-
mation asymmetry: entrepreneurs inevitably know much more 
than investors about their business; (3) Agency costs: entrepre-
neurs will be tempted to shirk and engage in self-dealing.17 
This well-known ―trio of problems‖ applies directly to crowd-
funding, where they will present themselves in ―extreme form‖ 
due to the very early stage of the startups involved.18 
Thus the important question this Article addresses is 
 
 11. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed 
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 
879, 935 (2011) (expressing concern over ―the capacity for fraud in crowdfund-
ing‖); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social 
Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption 
Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1769 
(2012) (discussing crowdfunding and concluding ―that social media technolo-
gies increase . . . the potential for fraud‖). 
 12. See, e.g., Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory 
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284–85 (2014); Robert B. Thompson & 
Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepre-
neurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1605 (2013). 
 13. See, e.g., John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowd-
fund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 616 (2013). 
 14. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for 
Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 601–02 (2015); see also Michael B. Dorff, The 
Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 513 (2014); Gmeleen 
Faye B. Tomboc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. MARSHALL J. 
INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 253, 266–69 (2013). 
 15. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities 
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 106–07. 
 16. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding 
and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 251–58 (claiming that 
―[e]quity [c]rowdfunding [i]s [d]oomed‖ for a half-dozen independent reasons). 
 17. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from 
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003); see Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 41 n.9 (2006) (―This model . . . can be found 
in virtually any academic discussion . . . .‖). 
 18. Gilson, supra note 17; see Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 573–76 (applying 
Gilson‘s framework to crowdfunding). 
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whether crowdfunding can respond to these three fundamental 
problems in an efficient way. Indeed, the various academic cri-
tiques can generally be categorized as claims that one or anoth-
er of the trio of problems will prove intractable for crowdfund-
ing. For example, those who predict adverse selection are 
worried about information asymmetry;19 those who predict 
fraud are concerned about agency costs.20 Rather than taking 
them one at a time, this Article systematically examines the 
three fundamental challenges of entrepreneurial finance in the 
context of crowdfunding. 
Part I provides a primer on crowdfunding, describing the 
authorizing legislation and its underlying policies. Part II then 
introduces the trio of problems, namely uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs, and predicts how they 
will reveal themselves in crowdfunding, setting the stage for 
the heart of the Article in Parts III and IV. 
Part III takes a close look at the way in which three tradi-
tional forms of entrepreneurial finance—venture capital (VC), 
angel investing, and public companies—have addressed the trio 
of problems. Can any of the tools honed and perfected over the 
years in these three contexts be applied to crowdfunding? Un-
fortunately, the mechanisms used in these traditional forms of 
entrepreneurial finance will not translate well to crowdfunding. 
While a handful appear to hold some relevance for crowdfund-
ing, none of the strongest methods used by VCs, angels, or pub-
lic shareholders to address the trio of problems hold much 
promise for crowdfunding. For example, VCs and angel inves-
tors participate actively in their portfolio companies, in part to 
monitor management, but this is not possible for the crowd. 
Similarly, public shareholders depend on mandatory disclosure, 
but the signature move of crowdfunding is to exempt these se-
curities from the usual disclosure requirements. In short, mere-
ly emulating what has worked in the past will likely prove in-
sufficient for crowdfunding to succeed. New ideas are needed. 
The primary contribution of this Article thus comes in Part 
IV, which describes a set of five novel methods for addressing 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the 
crowdfunding context. These novel mechanisms are not taken 
from traditional sources but rather are designed specifically for 
crowdfunding‘s distinctive digital context. 
First, crowdfunding can use the wisdom of the crowd to 
 
 19. See Ibrahim, supra note 14 (discussing information asymmetry). 
 20. See infra Part II.C (discussing examples of fraud). 
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distinguish between promising and poor investments.21 Second, 
digital shareholders can work together to crowdsource invest-
ment analysis on the Internet.22 Third, the promoters and 
management of a crowdfunding company will have their online 
reputation at stake, giving them an incentive to act fairly and 
properly.23 Fourth, crowdfunding companies can use securities-
based compensation, whereby management would be paid in 
the security being offered to the crowd.24 Fifth, digital monitor-
ing mechanisms can effectively address agency costs in crowd-
funding companies at low cost.25 Collectively these solutions 
provide a sound foundation for crowdfunding to function and 
even thrive. 
This Article makes at least three novel contributions to the 
literature: First, it systematically analyzes the three funda-
mental problems of finance in the context of crowdfunding.26 
Second, it examines the solutions employed in the analogous 
contexts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and de-
termines their relevance for crowdfunding.27 Third, and most 
importantly, it introduces a novel set of ―digital‖ methods to 
address the three challenges that are well-suited to crowdfund-
ing‘s institutional context.28 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO CROWDFUNDING   
The idea of allowing startups and small businesses to use 
the Internet to raise capital originated in the 1990s,29 but it 
was not until the 2010s that securities crowdfunding was final-
ly authorized by federal and state legislation.30 This Part intro-
duces the concept of securities crowdfunding and the recent le-
gal reforms that brought it into being. It also describes the 
compelling inclusive vision that crowdfunding offers to both en-
trepreneurs and investors. 
 
 21. Infra Part IV.A. 
 22. Infra Part IV.B. 
 23. Infra Part IV.C. 
 24. Infra Part IV.D. 
 25. Infra Part IV.E. 
 26. Infra Part II. 
 27. Infra Part III. 
 28. Infra Part IV. 
 29. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business 
Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57 (1998). 
 30. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 587 (―Twelve states have evidently 
tired of waiting for the SEC to act on Title III and have implemented their 
own intrastate Title III-like exemptions.‖). 
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A. CROWDFUNDING SECURITIES 
Securities crowdfunding is a new idea that builds off of the 
earlier concept of crowdsourcing.31 Crowdsourcing is where the 
public—the ―crowd‖—is invited to contribute to an online pro-
ject without compensation.32 Wikipedia is a famous example of 
an Internet-based encyclopedia, in which many workers, each 
adding just a bit, collectively created an amazing resource.33 
Crowdfunding differs from crowdsourcing in that the crowd is 
asked to contribute money rather than labor.34 To date, most 
crowdfunding projects have been in the form of ―reward‖ crowd-
funding where, in return for capital, the funding participants 
receive the fruits of the project, such as a book, CD, or video 
game.35 Websites such as Kickstarter have been doing reward 
crowdfunding for the past five years, during which time it has 
quickly grown into a $2 billion market.36 
Securities crowdfunding also will take place on the Inter-
net but will take the concept one step further. Funding partici-
pants will receive a security, such as a share of stock, a bond, or 
any other investment contract.37 For example, in exchange for 
an investment of $100, each investor might receive a share in a 
rock band‘s profits from their upcoming tour, which is itself fi-
nanced through these investments. Until the passage of recent 
federal legislation as discussed immediately below, however, 
crowdfunding securities in this way would violate the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 as an unregistered public offering.38 The law 
allows a person to solicit investments from the public if all that 
is promised is a CD or concert tickets, as in the case of reward 
crowdfunding.39 But in order to sell securities to the public, the 
 
 31. See generally DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING 2–4 (2013) (offer-
ing a formal definition of crowdsourcing); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–77 
(defining securities crowdfunding and providing background information). 
 32. See Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Crowdsourcing (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); infra Part IV.B. See generally 
BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12–13 (describing the internet‘s ability to foster 
dialogue). 
 33. See Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 34. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459. 
 35. See id. at 1459–60. 
 36. See Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015) (listing $2 billion pledged on Kickstarter since inception). 
 37. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–60. 
 38. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 39. Purchasing a CD or concert tickets from a reward crowdfunding web-
site would not qualify as a ―security‖ under the Securities Act, and was al-
SCHWARTZ_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:57 PM 
616 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:609 
 
Securities Act generally mandates that you first register the 
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), otherwise the securities can be cancelled and the money 
returned.40 That is, unless the offering is made under an ―ex-
emption‖ found in the Securities Act.  
―Exempt‖ offerings are exactly what they sound like; offer-
ings of securities without prior registration. Two important and 
long-standing exemptions are the private placement exemption, 
where one offers securities to an exclusive group of family and 
friends,41 and the accredited investor exemption, where one 
sells securities solely to wealthy people (―accredited‖ inves-
tors).42 Title III of the federal JOBS Act (also known as the 
CROWDFUND Act) added a new exemption for crowdfunded 
securities to this list,43 pending the promulgation of regulations 
by the SEC.44 In addition to that federal regime, a diverse 
group of states have recently used the existing intrastate ex-
emption to create an in-state crowdfunding regime.45 
These new laws authorize the crowdfunding of any type of 
security, including common stock, preferred stock, bonds, or 
any sort of ―investment contract.‖46 This author has opined that 
debt may be an attractive type of security to crowdfund,47 but 
many others expect that equity will play the primary role, as it 
has in the traditional contexts of VCs, angels, and public com-
panies.48  
 
lowed before the recent legislative changes. Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding 
and an Innovator’s Access to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 890 (2014). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77t, 77h-1. 
 41. Id. § 77d(a)(2). 
 42. Id. § 77d(a)(5). To qualify as an accredited investor, one must general-
ly possess a net worth that exceeds $1,000,000 (excluding one‘s primary resi-
dence) or an annual income that exceeds $200,000 individually or $300,000 
jointly for each of the past two years. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2015). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). The CROWDFUND Act is Title III of the broad-
er ―JOBS Act,‖ which entered into law in April 2012. Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012)). 
 44. See supra note 1. 
 45. See supra note 30. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); see S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–
99 (1946) (defining ―investment contract‖). 
 47. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1488–89. 
 48. See, e.g., Parsont, supra note 12, at 289–90 (predicting the growth of 
―equity-based sites‖). This Article addresses itself to the crowdfunding of any 
and all types of securities. However, because of the overriding importance of 
equity (including securities convertible to equity) to the traditional modes of 
entrepreneurial finance—VCs, angels and public companies—this Article dis-
cusses, where appropriate, concepts that are relevant only to equity securities. 
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The federal CROWDFUND Act includes a number of limi-
tations on the crowdfunding of securities,49 including the fol-
lowing: Companies may not raise more than $1 million annual-
ly via crowdfunding.50 Investors may only invest a maximum of 
5% of their annual income or net worth in all crowdfunded se-
curities each year.51 Crowdfunding transactions must be con-
ducted through an intermediary broker dealer or ―funding por-
tal.‖52 Issuers may not advertise to the public directly.53 
Investors who have pledged to invest may cancel their com-
mitment before the deal closes.54 
The emphasis of the statute (and this Article) is on startup 
companies, although this is not a strict requirement.55 Almost 
any corporation or other business organized under state law 
will be authorized to issue securities through crowdfunding. 
The exceptions are publicly traded companies, investment com-
panies, and foreign companies, all of which are prohibited from 
employing the crowdfunding exemption.56 
Crowdfunding issuers must provide some basic disclosures 
to the public, including (a) the name, address, and website of 
the company; (b) the names of directors, officers, and substan-
tial investors; (c) a description of the business and the antici-
pated business plan; and (d) a description of the issuer‘s finan-
cial condition.57 Issuers must also provide a description of the 
purpose and intended use of the proceeds, the target offering 
 
See, e.g., infra Part III.C.4 (discussing shareholder derivative actions); infra 
Part III.C.7 (discussing appraisal and Weinberger). A discussion specific to 
debt-based crowdfunding is beyond the scope of the present Article but would 
appear to be a worthy subject of future work. 
 49. For a more complete discussion, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460–
66. 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A). 
 51. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i). Wealthy investors can invest up to 10%. Id. 
§ 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
 52. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C). 
 53. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2). 
 54. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7). 
 55. See supra note 4. 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(f). 
 57. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1). The disclosure requirements concerning the financial 
condition of the issuer vary depending on the size of the offering. Offerings 
under $100,000 must provide income tax returns for the last fiscal year and 
unaudited financial statements certified as accurate by the principle executive 
officer. For offerings over $100,000 and up to $500,000, financial statements 
reviewed by an independent public accountant are required. For offerings 
greater than $500,000, audited financial statements are required. Id. § 77d-
1(b)(1)(D)(i)–(iii). 
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amount, the price of the securities to be offered, and a descrip-
tion of the ownership and capital structure of the issuer.58 Fol-
lowing a crowdfunding round, an issuer must annually file with 
the SEC, and make available to investors, financial statements 
and a report on the results of operations.59 
Issuers are prohibited from advertising the offering them-
selves, and any solicitation of the offering must go through the 
registered funding portal.60 Crowdfunded securities cannot be 
transferred or sold by investors for one year after the date of 
purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an 
offering registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or 
family member.61 The CROWDFUND Act authorizes civil ac-
tions for fraud against issuers, directors, and officers.62 Finally, 
the Act expressly prohibits the several states from adding addi-
tional reporting requirements for crowdfunded securities.63 
The SEC recently promulgated ―Regulation Crowdfund-
ing,‖ as commanded by the CROWDFUND Act.64 Once the 
SEC‘s final regulations go into effect in 2016, interstate crowd-
funding will commence.65  
On the state level, more than a dozen have enacted legisla-
tion or administrative rules authorizing securities crowdfund-
ing within their borders,66 pursuant to the venerable intrastate 
exemption.67 This is a diverse group of states, both geograph-
ically and politically, including Colorado,68 Georgia,69 Massa-
chusetts,70 Michigan,71 Tennessee72 and Texas.73 All of these in-
 
 58. Issuers must also announce the deadline to reach their target 
amounts and provide regular updates regarding their progress toward meeting 
their target amounts. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E)–(H). If the issuer fails to reach the 
goal, the whole transaction is cancelled. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7). 
 59. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4). 
 60. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2). 
 61. Id. § 77d-1(e). 
 62. Id. § 77d-1(c)(1)–(3). 
 63. Id. § 77r(a)(1), (b)(4)(C). 
 64. See supra note 1. 
 65. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 1.  
 66. Thirteen states had enacted intrastate crowdfunding rules as of No-
vember 2014. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 9. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). 
 68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.5 (2015). 
 69. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2012). 
 70. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015). 
 71. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2102a (2015). 
 72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A) (2014). 
 73. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (2014). 
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trastate schemes bear a close resemblance to the federal 
CROWDFUND Act, albeit with small changes here and there. 
For instance, several states increased the maximum amount 
issuers can raise to $2 million, rather than $1 million as in the 
federal act.74 These modest changes do not affect the basic 
character of crowdfunding securities, and they need not be 
elaborated further. 
The important point for present purposes is that the rapid 
adoption of crowdfunding legislation across a wide variety of 
states indicates a high level of enthusiasm for this new method 
of financing startups. Indeed, many of these intrastate crowd-
funding schemes were enacted as a direct result of frustration 
with the SEC‘s delay in implementing the CROWDFUND 
Act.75 These various state legislatures want crowdfunding to 
begin as soon as possible for their constituencies, which is a 
strong vote of support for the vision of crowdfunding, the sub-
ject of the next Section. 
B. THE VISION OF CROWDFUNDING 
Crowdfunding offers a compelling and inclusive vision that 
promises benefits for investors, entrepreneurs, and the econo-
my as a whole. This is why the federal JOBS Act passed with a 
large bipartisan majority and why so many states have enacted 
intrastate crowdfunding regimes of their own. 
Crowdfunding has two primary goals, one relating to en-
trepreneurs and one relating to investors. First, crowdfunding 
can empower entrepreneurs from coast to coast to use social 
networks and the Internet to obtain business capital at a rea-
sonable cost. Second, crowdfunding can democratize the market 
for financing speculative companies by inviting ordinary peo-
ple—―digital shareholders‖—to make investments that are cur-
rently offered solely to accredited (wealthy) investors. 
1. Startup Nation76 
There is widespread agreement that entrepreneurship is 
vital to innovation, economic growth, and employment in the 
 
 74. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(b) (2014). 
 75. See, e.g., Lee Schafer, State Can’t Wait for Feds on This Kind of Fund-
raiser, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 12, 2014, at D1; Davidoff Solomon, su-
pra note 9 (―While the Securities and Exchange Commission dawdles, states 
are rushing to adopt their own crowdfunding rules.‖). 
 76. See generally DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION (2009) 
(describing Israel‘s startup culture).  
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contemporary United States.77 Startups in their first year have 
reportedly been responsible for all net job creation in the Unit-
ed States since at least the 1970s, having added about three 
million jobs per year, even during recessions.78 Startups are 
similarly important for innovation and general economic 
growth.79 Although many of these start-ups eventually fold,80 
those that survive are often the type of companies that create 
satisfying employment opportunities and whose products or 
services improve our quality of life.81 
Our leaders and policy makers have long understood the 
importance of entrepreneurship to a thriving economy and soci-
ety. President Obama has said that ―entrepreneurialism is the 
key to our continued global leadership and the success of our 
people.‖82 In the same vein, Congress has twice declared that 
―it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal 
Government to . . . provide an opportunity for entrepreneur-
ship . . . and the creation and growth of small businesses.‖83 
And this has not been empty rhetoric: A portion of all federal 
contract dollars are statutorily required to go to small busi-
nesses, and the Small Business Administration guarantees 
loans for small businesses and provides free counseling and 
training to entrepreneurs.84 Similarly, state and local govern-
ments expend resources attracting entrepreneurs to their 
communities.85 In short, entrepreneurship is in the public in-
 
 77. E.g., Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17; Ruth Simon & Caelainn Barr, Endangered Spe-
cies: Young U.S. Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3–4, 2015, at A1 (―It‘s part 
of the vitality of this country to have people starting new businesses and try-
ing new things.‖ (quoting Harvard Business School Professor John Davis)).  
 78. See TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN 
JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION 2–6 (2010). 
 79. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a) (2012) (declaring a congressional policy of 
fostering small business growth). 
 80. See Steve Lohr, To Create Jobs, Nurture Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
12, 2010, at BU3.  
 81. See id. (―[Small businesses that survive] are prime candidates 
to . . . make an outsize contribution to innovation, productivity gains and job 
growth . . . .‖).  
 82. Obama, supra note 77; accord President Barack Obama, State of the 
Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), reprinted in 156 CONG. REC. 790 (2010) (stat-
ing that ―most new jobs‖ start in ―companies that begin when an entrepreneur 
takes a chance on a dream or a worker decides it‘s time she became her own 
boss‖). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a); accord id. § 631(a). 
 84. See What We Do, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/about 
-sba/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 85. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Hoping To Lure Tech Jobs, City Seeks a 
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terest and start-up companies are actively encouraged as a 
matter of public policy. 
Yet even as we recognize that entrepreneurship is so im-
portant to a thriving economy and society, we must also 
acknowledge that startups commonly have great difficulty ob-
taining the financing they need.86 This lack of access to financ-
ing disproportionately affects certain types of entrepreneurs, 
namely those that are ―out-of-the-loop‖ for one reason or anoth-
er and do not have connections with angel investors or other 
wealthy financiers. 
The traditional first source for entrepreneurial financing is 
from the entrepreneur‘s friends and family, as well as their 
own personal savings.87 Most people, however, have negligible 
personal savings, and the same can be said of their friends, so 
it comes down to whether the entrepreneur has a wealthy rela-
tive. Moving beyond friends and family, a bank is another po-
tential source of startup capital. In practice, however, banks 
are generally hesitant to extend credit to startup companies in 
their earliest stages, as the risk is simply too high.88 Many en-
trepreneurs use credit cards for startup financing,89 but the 
high interest rate and relatively low limits mean that other fi-
nancing sources are needed. 
Another option is to obtain capital from professional early-
stage investors, such as angel investors or venture capital 
funds. But there is tremendous competition for such invest-
 
Partner To Open a Graduate School of Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, 
at A34 (noting that a desire to spawn ―technology-based start-up companies‖ 
in New York is behind the city‘s willingness to ―make a significant investment‖ 
in an engineering school). 
 86. Simon & Barr, supra note 77 (―Many banks that pulled back on small-
business lending during the recession that stretched from December 2007 to 
June 2009 have continued to keep lending standards tight.‖); see PERI PAKROO, 
THE WOMEN‘S SMALL BUSINESS START-UP KIT 98–99 (2010) (noting banks‘ re-
luctance to lend to first-time entrepreneurs). 
 87. PAKROO, supra note 86, at 104; see Angus Loten, For Startups, Self-
Reliance Comes at a Cost, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B5 (reporting on entre-
preneurs‘ increasing reliance on personal finances in recent years). 
 88. RHONDA ABRAMS, THE OWNER‘S MANUAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 215–
16 (2005); PAKROO, supra note 86; Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Small-
Business Lending Stuck in the Slow Lane, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, at A1 
(―The number of loans for $1 million or less held by banks is down about 14% 
to 23.5 million since 2008.‖). 
 89. ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION 228 (2000) (―[C]redit 
cards have become the number one source of financing for small businesses—
supplanting bank loans in the late 1990s.‖); Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough 
To Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal 
Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407, 428. 
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ments and such investors are interested in certain types of 
companies, often in limited geographic areas. Importantly, an-
gels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making it difficult to 
get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with 
such investors or their acquaintances.90 
Furthermore, the investing approach and expectations of 
VCs can shape the types of companies that get funded. In par-
ticular, VCs tend to seek ―scalable‖ businesses, not ordinary 
brick-and-mortar companies, even profitable ones.91 While this 
may make good sense as a business matter, the effect is that 
companies in certain lines of business generally cannot attract 
the attention of VCs. 
Finally, an entrepreneur could attempt to obtain capital 
from the public through an initial public offering (IPO). An 
IPO, however, implicates the heart of the Securities Act‘s regis-
tration provisions, as well as the many regulations promulgat-
ed thereunder. As a result, compliance costs for an IPO can eas-
ily run to several million dollars,92 making an IPO economically 
infeasible for nearly all early-stage startups. 
To sum up, many entrepreneurs have great difficulty fi-
nancing startup companies. Even worse, this problem appears 
to be exacerbated for women and racial minorities.93 The litera-
ture in the area shows that most startups founded by African-
Americans receive little or no outside financing from any 
source, indicating a severe lack of access to startup financing.94 
In a similar vein, only about 7% of venture capital funds go to 
 
 90. See Loten, supra note 87 (reporting on ―the clubby venture-capital 
world,‖ the importance of connections and introductions, and the reality that 
finding VC funding is challenging for those who are ―not very well connected‖). 
 91. Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, Yester-
day’s Start-Ups, 2. MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 229 (2013). 
 92. Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 
49 (2015) (reporting that the average regulatory compliance costs total about 
$3.5 million for small issuers going public in an IPO). 
 93. See, e.g., PAKROO, supra note 86, at 96–100 (describing special difficul-
ties of female entrepreneurs); ALICIA ROBB, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ACCESS 
TO CAPITAL AMONG YOUNG FIRMS, MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, WOMEN-OWNED 
FIRMS, AND HIGH-TECH FIRMS 2–3 (Apr. 2013). 
 94. E.g., Paroma Sanyal & Catherine L. Mann, The Financial Structure of 
Startup Firms: The Role of Assets, Information, and Entrepreneur Characteris-
tics 15–16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 10-17, Dec. 2010) 
(―[S]tartups owned by African-American entrepreneurs have a lower probabil-
ity of having any type of external finance, especially external equity, and in-
stead finance their firms through personal resources. Based on odds ratios, we 
find that such businesses are . . . 98 percent less likely to use external equity, 
compared to using internal equity.‖ (emphasis omitted)). 
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women-led businesses95 and less than 1% go to businesses 
founded by African-Americans.96  
Geographical constraints similarly hinder some entrepre-
neurs, especially because angel investors and venture capital-
ists tend to stay close to home.97 A startup based in San Fran-
cisco has a better chance of being funded than one based in 
Toledo simply because there is a much larger community of po-
tential funders in the former. More generally, rural entrepre-
neurs are at a distinct disadvantage compared with their urban 
counterparts.98 
Youthful entrepreneurs likewise have exceptional difficulty 
finding financing.99 This is especially unfortunate, as young 
people are known to challenge orthodox thinking and may be 
able to offer fresh, new solutions to vexing problems.100 
Crowdfunding offers a new and inclusive way to bring 
needed financing to startups all across America, from coast to 
coast, in rural areas and urban, to entrepreneurs rich and poor, 
young and old, men and women of every race, ethnicity, and re-
ligion. Because it is Internet-based and so much less costly 
 
 95. Hollie Slade, Why Is It So Hard for Female Entrepreneurs To Get VC 
Funding? Could Crowdfunding Be the Answer?, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2013, 10:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollieslade/2013/11/29/why-is-it-so-hard-for 
-female-entrepreneurs-to-get-vc-funding-could-crowdfunding-be-the-answer; 
see Richard T. Harrison & Colin M. Mason, Does Gender Matter? Women Busi-
ness Angels and the Supply of Entrepreneurial Finance, 31 ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP THEORY & PRAC. 445, 449–50 (2007) (finding that women comprise a sim-
ilarly small percentage of angel investors). But cf. Sanyal & Mann, supra note 
94, at 16 (―In contrast to other research, women owners do not show a differ-
ent financial structure from startups where the primary owner is male.‖ (em-
phasis omitted)). 
 96. Venture Capital Demographics—87% of VC-Backed Founders Are 
White; All-Asian Teams Raise Largest Funding Rounds, CB INSIGHTS  
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-demographics 
-87-percent-vc-backed-founders-white-asian-teams-raise-largest-funding. 
 97. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS . . . AND HOW 
IT‘S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 50–51 
(2002); Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE 
CAPITAL 71, 73 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010) (explaining that angel investors 
tend to limit their investments to startups within a three-hour drive); Randall 
Stross, It’s Not Who You Know. It’s Where You Are, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, 
at BU3 (reporting that some venture capital firms in Silicon Valley adhere to a 
―twenty minute rule,‖ which provides that ―if a start-up company seeking ven-
ture capital is not within a 20-minute drive of the venture firm‘s offices, it will 
not be funded‖). 
 98. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 287. 
 99. Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515, 
521–23 (2014); Simon & Barr, supra note 77. 
 100. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 518.  
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than a traditional public offering, crowdfunding will provide an 
opportunity for anyone with an idea to go online and seek fund-
ing to make it a reality. Not just those in Silicon Valley; not 
just those with wealthy friends; not just those with connections. 
Crowdfunding will be open to anyone and can thereby create a 
startup nation where every state and locality, and every field of 
endeavor,101 is the subject of active entrepreneurship. 
Is this inclusive vision realistic? Based on results in reward 
crowdfunding and related fields, there is good reason to expect 
it to come to fruition. Consider the issue of female and minority 
entrepreneurs, who have long had a more difficult time obtain-
ing financing from traditional sources such as banks.102 In re-
ward crowdfunding, by contrast, it turns out that female found-
ers are ―considerably more likely to successful [sic] raise capital 
than male founders,‖ all else being equal.103 Similarly, in the 
related field of peer-to-peer lending, where consumers make 
online loans to one another, lenders are less influenced by ra-
cial and other stereotypes than are banks and other traditional 
financial institutions.104 These bits of evidence buttress the ex-
pectation that crowdfunding will be more egalitarian and inclu-
sive than traditional forms of business finance. 
To summarize this Subsection: the first goal of crowdfund-
ing is to create an inclusive culture of entrepreneurship open to 
all Americans and, considering the above discussion, crowd-
funding is well positioned to meet this goal. 
2. Digital Shareholders 
The second goal of crowdfunding is to democratize the 
 
 101. Crowdfunding may not be appropriate for every type of business. For 
one important example, ventures that are heavily dependent on intellectual 
property, such as a new invention, may wish to avoid crowdfunding so as not 
to give away their valuable secrets. They may be better off looking for VC or 
angel funding and requiring that potential investors sign a non-disclosure 
agreement, an action that would be infeasible or ineffective in the crowdfund-
ing context. Alternatively, such ventures may be able to avoid giving away se-
crets by providing the crowd with only vague information. 
 102. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96. 
 103. Jason Greenberg & Ethan Mollick, Leaning in or Leaning on? Gender, 
Homophily, and Activism in Crowdfunding (July 3, 2014) (unpublished manu-
script) (emphasis omitted), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462254; cf. Slade, supra 
note 95 (―Crowdfunding eliminates bias . . . allowing true market interest to 
decide which ideas live or die.‖). 
 104. Michal Herzenstein et al., The Democratization of Personal Consumer 
Loans? Determinants of Success in Online Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions 31 
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rice.edu/nationalmedia/  
multimedia/online. 
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market for investing in startup companies. For decades, the 
chance to invest in private startups has been legally available 
only to wealthy investors and friends of the founders.105 This 
differential treatment between the wealthy and the rest was an 
artifact of two exemptions embedded in federal securities law. 
First, the law has always exempted private offerings from 
the registration requirement, that is, offerings made available 
to an exclusive group of known people, not the general pub-
lic.106 Second, there is a longstanding exemption for offerings 
made only to wealthy investors that are ―accredited‖ by the 
SEC to make such investments.107 This latter exemption dates 
back to an SEC regulation adopted in 1982, which clarified that 
wealthy people—those with a net worth of more than $1 mil-
lion—were deemed to be ―accredited.‖108 
The practical effect of these two exemptions is that entre-
preneurs do everything they can to avoid making an offering to 
the public109 and instead sell unregistered securities of their 
startup companies only to people that come within either the 
private offering exemption (family and friends) or the accredit-
ed investor exemption (the wealthy).110 Non-millionaires have 
been left out, effectively barred from investing in strangers‘ 
startup companies, thanks to this regulatory apparatus. 
Crowdfunding is designed to break down this barrier by 
empowering ordinary non-accredited investors—―digital share-
holders‖111—to take a chance and invest in the same type of un-
registered securities of a stranger‘s startup.112 Digital share-
 
 105. See Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3389 (―Securities law‘s dirty little se-
cret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments . . . that 
everyone else does not.‖). 
 106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (exempting certain transactions from 
prohibitions relating to the sale of transactions). 
 107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).  
 108. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5), 230.215(e). 
 109. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 
338 (2013) (recounting Facebook‘s efforts to avoid an initial public offering). 
 110. Press Release, White House, supra note 6 (―Right now, you can only 
turn to a limited group of investors—including banks and wealthy individu-
als—to get funding. Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible 
for others to invest.‖). 
 111. The term ―shareholder‖ is used loosely here to include investors hold-
ing any type of security, not just common stock. See supra note 7. 
 112. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 n.12 (proposed Nov. 5, 
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–240, 249) (―[C]rowdfunding is premised on permitting 
sales of securities to any interested person, not just to investors who meet spe-
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holders will be skilled with the Internet and open to new 
things—after all, they tried crowdfunding.  
Digital shareholders will likely be a diverse community,113 
simply because it will be open to anyone and everyone.114 This 
prediction is buttressed by the current experience in reward 
crowdfunding, where the community of investors is diverse, at 
least in terms of demographics. Backers come from every in-
come level, with half of backers making under $50,000 per 
year.115 Women comprise almost half of the backers on Kick-
starter.116 Kickstarter is accessible to people of every age, eth-
nicity, and political persuasion.117 
Digital shareholders will be particularly diverse compared 
to the traditional sources of entrepreneurial financing, angel 
investors, venture capitalists and public shareholders.118 Angel 
groups and VC funds are made up exclusively of accredited in-
vestors.119 Crowdfunding will be open to everyone.120 Angels 
 
cific qualifications, such as accredited investors.‖); Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclu-
sive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 13) 
(―Inclusivity is part of the essential nature of securities crowdfunding; it is 
what makes crowdfunding different from other methods of selling securities.‖). 
 113. This does not mean to assert that Americans will participate in line 
with overall demography, merely that the overall group of digital shareholders 
will likely be diverse in many ways. 
 114. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: HOW THE MANY ARE 
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, 
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 31 (2004) (―[T]he sheer size of most 
markets, coupled with the fact that anyone with money can enter them (you 
don‘t need to be admitted or hired), means that a certain level of diversity is 
almost guaranteed.‖).  
 115. Nick Littlefield, Kickstats: 4 Things You Need To Know About the De-
mographics of Crowdfunding, CROWDLIFTED (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www 
.crowdlifted.com/news/2013/11/kickstats-4-things-you-need-to-know-about-the 
-demographics-of-crowdfunding#. 
 116. Dan Marom, Alicia Robb & Orly Sade, Gender Dynamics in Crowd-
funding (Kickstarter): Evidence on Entrepreneurs, Investors, Deals and Taste 
Based Discrimination 7 (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442954. 
 117. See Littlefield, supra note 115 (suggesting that people of diverse back-
grounds participate in crowdfunding through Kickstarter).  
 118. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,434 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239–240, 249) (―Congress intended for investment opportunities 
through crowdfunding transactions . . . to be available to all types of inves-
tors . . . .‖); Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 611 (―Crowdfunding brings the masses 
of everyday retail investors into what historically has been the nearly exclu-
sive domain of venture capitalists and other wealthy investors.‖). 
 119. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 3397–402 (describing the role of angel and 
VC investors in accredited investing). 
 120. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431. 
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and VCs tend to invest in certain geographic areas, including 
Silicon Valley and New York.121 Crowdfunding will be a na-
tionwide (or statewide) market available to anyone with an In-
ternet connection.122 Digital shareholders will likely be even 
more diverse than shareholders of public companies. The 
shareholder base of large public companies these days is pri-
marily made up of institutional entities.123 Retail investors 
trading shares for their own account comprises a rather small 
share of the contemporary public market.124 Crowdfunding will 
present the opposite situation, for the entire body of investors 
will be individual digital shareholders.125 
The inclusive vision of crowdfunding has been criticized by 
some as nothing more than a nefarious scheme to give ―middle 
class families the same opportunities that millionaires have 
always had to lose their money.‖126 While it is true that many 
 
 121. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 283–84. 
 122. This represents just about everyone, as more than 98% of Americans 
can reportedly access the Internet by either wired or wireless connection. EX-
EC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED BROADBAND SOLUTIONS 3 
(2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/community-based_ 
broadband_report_by_executive_office_of_the_president.pdf; THOM FILE & 
CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013 (2014), http://www.census.gov/history/pdf/2013computer 
use.pdf (reporting that about three-quarters of American households have In-
ternet access at home). 
 123. Institutional investors hold 70% of the shares of the largest public 
companies. Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Interme-
diary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 n.9 (2014) (citing CONFER-
ENCE BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET AL-
LOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13 (2010)); see 
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 863, 875 (2013) (―Put graphically but not metaphorically, representatives 
of institutions that collectively represent effective control of many large U.S. 
corporations could fit around a boardroom table.‖). 
 124. See Edelman et al., supra note 123. 
 125. See Littlefield, supra note 115 (―Kickstarter‘s core user is decidedly 
not from the same demographic profile as the standard equity investor.‖). The 
originating statute does not appear to prohibit institutional investors or other 
legal persons from participating in crowdfunding, but the presumption is that 
the investors will be natural persons. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-116, 126 Stat. 316–18 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)); Littlefield, supra note 115 (analyzing Kickstart-
er‘s over 5.5 million individual contributors).  
 126. 157 CONG. REC. H7286 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis). See 
generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Nonpecuniary Benefits of Crowdfunding, 
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565 (2015) (addressing critics‘ concern that inves-
tors will yield negative returns through crowdfunding and enumerating the 
benefits of crowdfunding). 
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crowdfunded companies will surely fail, it seems only fair to 
give everyone, not just the wealthy and connected, the freedom 
to take their chances and invest a small amount in what they 
hope will be the next Uber.127 
Will non-accredited, retail investors take advantage of this 
opportunity to become digital shareholders? It seems likely 
they will. Consider the very existence of the securities laws. 
The underlying concern of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was that 
people will gladly hand their money over to entrepreneurs if al-
lowed to do so.128 Those laws, including the registration re-
quirement, erected a barricade between untested startup com-
panies and retail investors that has stood for almost a 
century.129 The JOBS Act drills a hole in that wall.130 There is 
every reason to expect that American investors will act just as 
they always have and buy into the prospect that this or that 
company is the next big thing. A hint of the enthusiasm that 
investors may show for crowdfunding securities has already 
been seen on reward crowdfunding websites.131 The immense 
and growing popularity of reward crowdfunding provides 
ground for optimism regarding the prospects that investors of 
 
 127. 157 CONG. REC. H7287 (Nov. 3, 2011) (statement by Rep. Polis) 
(―[M]ost of these companies aren‘t going to work out. That‘s the nature of capi-
talism. Most of them are going to go out of business. . . . But do you know 
what? Some of them are going to work out. We could see the next Google, the 
next Yahoo!, the next Microsoft. Many of these companies started as garage 
companies, funded by proverbial friends and family. The next great American 
success story can be funded by crowd[fund]ing. It can have thousands of inves-
tors from middle class families across the country, earning millions of dollars 
on their investments . . . .‖). Uber, an app-based transportation company, was 
founded in 2009 and valued five years later at over $40 billion. Douglas Mac-
Millan et al., Investors Push Uber’s Valuation Past $40 Billion, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 5, 2014, at A1.  
 128. See Hazen, supra note 11, at 1741 (noting that the registration, disclo-
sure, and reporting requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Act sought to protect 
consumers). 
 129. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1460, 1468–70 (describing the complexities 
of the registration requirement under the 1933 Securities Act). 
 130. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the 
Federalist Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The 
Jobs Act,” 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453, 488 (2013) (calling the JOBS Act ―the big-
gest deregulatory statute in the history of American securities regulation‖ 
(quoting Professor Robert Thompson)). 
 131. As of July 2010, promoters on Kickstarter had raised a total of $15 
million for 1600 projects. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online 
Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 73 (2011). Five years later, the total is more than 100 
times larger. Stats, supra note 36 (reporting that $2 billion has been pledged 
for more than 94,000 projects). 
SCHWARTZ_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:57 PM 
2015] THE DIGITAL SHAREHOLDER 629 
 
all types will embrace the opportunity that the JOBS Act pro-
vides.132 
In short, crowdfunding is designed to, and likely will, give 
rise to the phenomenon of the digital shareholder, a new, inclu-
sive and diverse class of investor that will democratize the 
market for entrepreneurial financing.  
II.  THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE   
The vision of crowdfunding just described133 is a compelling 
one, but the form faces significant obstacles. It is generally ac-
cepted in the literature that all methods of investing pose three 
fundamental problems that must be addressed in order for the 
form to function: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and 
agency costs.134 This Part introduces this ―trio of problems‖135 
and explains why they will present themselves in ―extreme 
form‖ in the context of crowdfunding.136 
A. UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty is inherent in investing because the future is 
unpredictable.137 There is no way to know in advance which 
companies will succeed and which will fail, yet the nature of in-
vesting is that one must hand over one‘s money based on 
guesses about how the future will play out. Thus, the term un-
certainty, as used here, refers to ―contingencies that none of the 
parties can definitively predict (for example, the success of a 
 
 132. See supra note 131. 
 133. See supra Part I.B. 
 134. This tripartite analysis was first presented, at least in this crystal-
lized form, in Gilson, supra note 17 (―Absent a workable response, the extremi-
ty of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problems likely would 
raise the cost of external capital to a point of market failure.‖). It has since 
been widely adopted by numerous other scholars. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 
17, at 48 (―VC scholarship has [long] been concerned with primarily one ques-
tion: How do VC investors respond to the extreme uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and agency problems inherent in VC investment?‖ (citing Gilson, 
supra note 17)); Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt As Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1169, 1190 (―One of the most-discussed topics in the venture capital lit-
erature is how VCs select and monitor start-ups in the face of extreme levels of 
uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs.‖ (citing Gilson, supra 
note 17)); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 767, 792 (2015) (―[E]very business must address . . . uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs.‖ (citing Gilson, supra note 17)). 
 135. Gilson, supra note 17. 
 136. See id.  
 137. Id. at 1076–77. 
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firm‘s research and commercialization efforts, the market‘s ul-
timate receptivity to a firm‘s product, the success of competing 
research efforts, and macroeconomic and industry condi-
tions).‖138 
Crowdfunding is designed as a vehicle to fund startups at 
their infancy,139 which necessarily present a much greater de-
gree of uncertainty than do existing businesses.140 An invest-
ment in a toll bridge must be made in part on the basis of the 
anticipated traffic volume, but that cannot be predicted with 
certainty, making the investment uncertain. Compare the toll 
bridge investment with an investment in a startup coordinating 
―rideshares‖ over that bridge through smartphones.141 The lat-
ter is clearly subject to many additional levels, layers and 
forms of uncertainty regarding technology, commuter ac-
ceptance, government regulation or prohibition, the outcome of 
strategic decisions, and myriad other considerations.142 
In short, uncertainty is at a height for the type of startups 
that will use crowdfunding, making potential investors reticent 
to invest. More formally, uncertainty raises the cost of capital 
and, at the extreme, could shut off a company from financing 
entirely.143 It must be addressed for crowdfunding to function. 
 
 138. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 874, 879 n.14 (2003). 
 139. Crowdfunding is generally available for any type of private company, 
but its core goal is to advance startup companies. See supra note 5. But cf. 
Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding Is Crowdfunding for Startups Across the 
Private Equity Gap, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y (forthcoming 2016) (man-
uscript at 25) (suggesting that crowdfunding would be most useful for compa-
nies that have already attracted angel investors). 
 140. Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regula-
tions Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 121 (2010) 
(―Because startup companies are new ventures operating outside of estab-
lished markets, investing in them involves substantial uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs.‖); Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: 
The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Con-
tracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 901 (2010). 
 141. See, e.g., CARMA, http://carmacarpool.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
(offering a commission-based smartphone app that ―enables you to find nearby 
people going your way so you can share your commute . . . [and] the cost of the 
journey‖). 
 142. See Cable, supra note 140 (explaining that uncertainty is inherent in 
startups because their innovative products and business design remain un-
tested). 
 143. Gilson, supra note 17. 
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B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
The idea of information asymmetry is that there is certain 
information that is known to founders, promoters, managers or 
other insiders, but not investors.144 Consider an investment in 
a farm. Plainly the farmer knows much more about the land 
and its operation—which fields have good drainage; whether 
the tractor is rusty; the planting habits of her neighbors—than 
do the investors. This sort of information asymmetry is exacer-
bated in the startup context, particularly if there is technology 
or science involved.145 Computer code, for example, is not easy 
to read or review; the programmer herself will surely know her 
code better than anyone on the outside looking in. 
Information asymmetry can lead to a market failure due to 
adverse selection, also known as the ―lemons‖ problem, famous-
ly espoused through the example of used cars.146 The lemons 
problem is this: Potential investors are aware that company in-
siders hold important information that they (the investors) can 
never truly know, and this makes it difficult to distinguish be-
tween good and bad investments. Investors can therefore be 
expected to discount all investments, including the good ones. 
Absent intervention, the expected effect is that all good invest-
ments will depart out of the market, leaving only bad ones.147 
Information asymmetry, and the lemons problem it can 
cause, applies forcefully to crowdfunding.148 Crowdfunding en-
trepreneurs will know much better than digital shareholders 
how successful their venture is likely to be.149 Consider the case 
of a downtown café. The founder knows how many other cafes 
already exist in the neighborhood, the going price for a cappuc-
 
 144. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138 (―‗[I]nformation asymmetry‘ refers to 
circumstances in which one party knows more about a particular fact relevant 
to the business than the other party does (for example, an employee or manag-
er knows more about how hard she works than the venture capitalist does).‖). 
 145. Gilson, supra note 17. 
 146. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–91 (1970). 
 147. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 784 (2001) (explaining that 
information asymmetry and adverse selection can combine to drive most of the 
honest share-issuers out of securities markets); Frank H. Easterbrook & Dan-
iel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 669, 673–76 (1984) (discussing the ―lemons‖ problem in securities mar-
kets and proposing potential solutions). 
 148. Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266; id. at 267 (―[O]nline investors face 
greater uncertainty than investors in offline brick and mortar businesses.‖). 
 149. See id. at 266. 
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cino, how hard she plans to work, and a thousand other things 
unknown to potential investors. All this represents information 
asymmetry. 
Furthermore, because promising entrepreneurs can be ex-
pected to have alternative avenues for financing, some com-
mentators predict that those with good prospects will prefer 
other financing sources (such as angel investors and VCs), leav-
ing crowdfunding investors with the leftovers.150 To some ex-
tent, this critique can be countered by the fact that an entre-
preneur need not necessarily choose between crowdfunding and 
the alternatives.151 But this is not a complete answer, and the 
lemons problem is a real one for crowdfunding.152 
To summarize, crowdfunded startups present a great deal 
of information asymmetry. If this issue is not sufficiently ad-
dressed, digital shareholders will refuse to invest and the mar-
ket will not function. 
C. AGENCY COSTS 
An ―agency‖ relationship is one in which one party, the 
―principal,‖ hires another party, the ―agent,‖ to perform some 
service for the benefit of the principal.153 Agency relationships 
can be tremendously valuable, for instance when an agent has 
specialized knowledge and training.154 All agency relationships, 
 
 150. E.g., Dorff, supra note 14, at 497 (―[I]t seems unlikely that any busi-
ness that could obtain angel investments would seek out crowdfunding in-
stead. Crowdfunding is therefore likely to attract those businesses that are 
least likely to succeed.‖); id. at 517 (―[E]quity crowdfunders will have available 
to them only those opportunities already rejected by more sophisticated inves-
tors.‖).  
 151. This has already occurred in an analogous space: SCiO, a startup 
making a small and affordable molecular sensor, raised $2.7 million through 
reward crowdfunding and millions more through accredited-only investing. 
Zack Miller, Don’t Believe These 4 Myths About Equity Crowdfunding, OUR 
CROWD (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blog.ourcrowd.com/index.php/2014/12/03/dont 
-believe-these-4-myths-about-equity-crowdfunding; SCiO: Your Sixth Sense: A 
Pocket Molecular Sensor for All!, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter 
.com/projects/903107259/scio-your-sixth-sense-a-pocket-molecular-sensor-fo 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 152. See Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 591–603 (identifying the potential for a 
―lemons‖ problem as a result of crowdfunding); Tomboc, supra note 14, at 266 
(explaining the ―lemons‖ problem in crowdfunding). 
 153. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308 (1976). 
 154. Consider the case of a surgeon who acts as the agent for the patient-
principal, providing services the patient obviously could not perform on her-
self.  
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however, suffer from a fundamental downside, namely that the 
agent‘s position allows her to act in her own interest as opposed 
to that of the principal.155 This divergence of interests is for-
mally known as ―agency costs.‖156 
Agency costs have been known since at least the age of Ad-
am Smith157 and are a ―pervasive fact of economic life.‖158 Con-
sider the following examples of agent misbehavior familiar 
from lived experience: an employee spends her time surfing the 
Internet rather than advancing the company‘s interest;159 a 
bartender provides drinks for cash and pockets the proceeds;160 
an investment bank‘s advice is tainted by personal interest.161 
Most important for present purposes, agency cost theory 
has played a dominant role in understanding business organi-
zations, including both public companies162 and private 
startups.163 The investors, as the ―owners‖ of the corporation, 
are seen as the principals. The top corporate managers are the 
agents of the investors, running the company for the latter‘s 
benefit.164 This analogy is imperfect,165 but it has served as a 
 
 155. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153. 
 156. Id.  
 157. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed., 
Modern Library 1937) (1776) (―[M]anagers . . . of other people‘s money . . . 
cannot well be expected [to] watch over it with the same anxious vigilance 
with which . . . [people] watch over their own.‖). 
 158. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeck-
hauser eds., 1985). 
 159. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK 38 (2009). 
 160. Don’t Let Your Bartenders Rob You Blind!, BOB JOHNSON‘S SCHOOL OF 
BAR MGMT., http://www.bobthebarguy.com/bmc.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 161. E.g., In re El Paso Corp. S‘holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434, 440, 442 
(Del. Ch. 2012) (finding that Goldman Sachs, serving as advisor (agent) to El 
Paso in its sale to Kinder Morgan, had a ―bias toward a suboptimally priced 
deal with Kinder Morgan‖ because it owned ―approximately 19%, or $4 billion 
worth, of Kinder Morgan stock,‖ and because ―the lead Goldman banker work-
ing for El Paso . . . personally owned approximately $340,000 of Kinder Mor-
gan stock‖); cf. id. at 434 (―Although Goldman‘s conflict was known, inade-
quate efforts to cabin its role were made . . . .‖). 
 162. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LE-
GAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 178 (11th ed. 2010) (explaining the dynamic 
between shareholder-agents and corporate manager-principals); George S. 
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 976 (2007). 
 163. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 51 (―[T]he influence of agency cost theory is 
clearly evident in virtually any discussion of VC investment.‖). 
 164. Geis, supra note 162; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309 
(―[T]he relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation fit 
the definition of a pure agency relationship.‖). 
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useful model for almost a century, since the path-breaking 
work of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means.166  
Their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, argued that the dispersed nature of public sharehold-
ers ―produces a condition where the interests of owner and of 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge.‖167 This ―separa-
tion of ownership and control‖ identified by Berle and Means 
was formalized and rechristened in the 1970s as ―agency costs‖ 
by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling.168 Golf cours-
es,169 sculpture gardens,170 and corporate jets171 are seen by 
some as expressions of the agency costs present in the tradi-
tional public company. As for private companies funded by VCs, 
the agency costs look somewhat different on the surface, but 
the basic problem is the same.172 Management, being human, 
will be constantly tempted to put their own interests ahead of 
those of their investors. 
Once crowdfunding goes live, and people across the country 
invest in companies via online portals, the management of the-
se companies will assume the position of agents, and the digital 
shareholders will act as principals. This will surely lead to the 
same sort of agency costs we have long observed in other con-
texts. Moreover, each investor will likely have a small amount 
at stake, thanks to the annual cap, akin to the traditional 
Berle-Means public corporation with dispersed shareholders.173 
 
 165. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1672 (―[M]ost scholars would probably agree that share-
holders are not really ‗owners‘ in the traditional sense . . . .‖ (collecting author-
ities)); see also Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, supra note 158, at 56 
(―To an experienced corporate lawyer . . . the assertion that corporate manag-
ers are agents of investors, whether debtholders or stockholders, will seem odd 
or loose.‖). 
 166. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see Bartlett, supra note 17, at 50 (stating 
that agency cost analysis is ―the primary analytical framework used in con-
temporary corporate scholarship‖). 
 167. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 6. 
 168. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 327. 
 169. See, e.g., Jacob Bunge, DuPont Holds onto Rare Assets, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 23, 2014, at B10. 
 170. See, e.g., Rachel A. Antman, Modern Sculptures, Outdoors and Free, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at F7 (describing the Donald M. Kendall Sculpture 
Gardens at PepsiCo‘s headquarters in Purchase, New York). 
 171. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, The Annual CEO Pay Survey: Firms Still 
Pay for Personal Jet Use, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2014, at B5. 
 172. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077. 
 173. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47–68. 
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Management will be in control of the company on a day-to-day 
basis,174 and would seem to be just as prone to shirking, steal-
ing, and generally acting against the investors‘ interest as any 
other agent would be. 
In other words, crowdfunded company managers are in an 
analogous position to public company managers vis-à-vis their 
shareholders. They will be managing ―other people‘s money,‖175 
and the usual agency costs will be present in the crowdfunding 
context as well. For example, if a rock band were to crowdfund 
securities that promise investors a portion of the profits from 
an upcoming tour, the investors are analogous to principals and 
the band is analogous to their agent. It is easy to imagine the 
band taking limousines to their shows, enjoying lovely buffets 
backstage, and throwing great after-parties—even though the-
se perks will cut into the investors‘ profit. 
Dealing with agency costs like these in the crowdfunding 
context is in the interest of all parties. For investors, the reason 
is obvious: they want the founders, promoters, and managers to 
do a good and faithful job running the company. As for promot-
ers, they realize that no one will invest in the company (or will 
only do so at a high cost of capital) unless they can assure po-
tential investors that agency costs will be sufficiently cab-
ined.176 Agency costs must be addressed for crowdfunding to 
function. 
This Part showed that erecting the legislative apparatus 
for crowdfunding is not enough to ensure that it will actually 
work. Crowdfunding must somehow solve the three fundamen-
tal problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agen-
cy costs, or be doomed to failure. 
The next two Parts take up this challenge. Part III will ex-
amine other related contexts where these three problems have 
been resolved, namely venture capital, angel investing, and 
public companies. The goal of Part III is to determine whether 
the techniques employed in those traditional forms of entrepre-
neurial finance for addressing the trio of problems would be 
appropriate for crowdfunding. Finally, Part IV will introduce a 
set of new and different responses specifically designed for 
crowdfunding. 
III.  MOST TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES WILL NOT 
 
 174. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015). 
 175. SMITH, supra note 157. 
 176. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153, at 309. 
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TRANSLATE TO CROWDFUNDING   
The three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial fi-
nance—uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency 
costs—are not new to crowdfunding. To the contrary, they have 
long been known by the traditional sources of American entre-
preneurial finance: venture capitalists, angel investors, and 
public shareholders. More importantly, each has responded to 
the trio of problems with methods that suit their particular in-
stitutional context. 
Rather than reinventing the wheel, it makes sense to ask 
first whether any of these techniques are appropriate for use in 
crowdfunding. Unfortunately, as this Part will show, none of 
the important and effective methods for addressing the trio of 
problems that have been developed by VCs, angels, or public 
investors will be of much use for crowdfunding. 
In a way, this should come as no surprise, as the economic 
circumstances are divergent. Public companies are raising 
hundreds of millions of dollars, VCs invest tens of millions of 
dollars, and even angel investments are generally over $1 mil-
lion. All crowdfunding rounds, by contrast, will be under $1 
million, per the statute.177 The mechanisms that make sense 
for raising many millions of dollars will understandably differ 
from those that make sense in the $100,000s.178 
This Part will review the key methods that VCs, angels, 
and public companies use to respond to the three problems of 
entrepreneurial finance and explain why those solutions will 
mostly not translate well to crowdfunding. 
A. SOLUTIONS FROM VENTURE CAPITAL 
Venture capitalists invest in high-risk, high-growth 
startup companies at an early stage of their development,179 
when the trio of problems present themselves in ―extreme 
form.‖180 Uncertainty as to how the startup will perform is 
greatly magnified because it is in such an early stage. Many fu-
ture decisions will have to be made by management, and the 
outcome of those decisions, and the effort expended, are highly 
 
 177. Indeed, they may be under $500,000 to avoid the cost of audited finan-
cial statements. See supra note 57. 
 178. Part IV will introduce a set of new methods that are particularly suit-
ed to the crowdfunding context. 
 179. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004). 
 180. See Gilson, supra note 17. 
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uncertain.181 If the business has a technological component, 
this adds scientific uncertainty.182 Information asymmetries be-
tween VCs and founders are also a major problem because the 
entrepreneur‘s ―intentions and abilities‖ are known to her but 
not the VC.183 Finally, agency costs are potentially quite signif-
icant for VCs,184 in part because the entrepreneur‘s interests 
can ―sharply diverge from those of the venture capital inves-
tors, especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the 
investment.‖185 
The American VC market has succeeded in the face of all 
these obstacles, funding such notable successes as Google186 
and Facebook.187 VCs have created and honed methods and 
techniques to address the trio of problems that make sense in 
this distinctive institutional context. The core of the VC solu-
tion is the syndicated and geographically concentrated use of 
comprehensive investment contracts that ―allow venture capi-
talists to screen, monitor, and control their investments‖ 
through a combination of staged financing, convertible pre-
ferred shares, control rights, and equity-based compensation.188 
Can these mechanisms be borrowed by crowdfunding? As 
will appear, most of the key methods used by VCs are inappro-
priate for crowdfunding. 
1. Staged Financing 
Instead of conveying their entire investment to a startup 
all at once, VCs stage their financing by divvying the money up 
over time, and conditioning the payouts on achieving designat-
 
 181. See id. at 1077. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 40. 
 185. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077. 
 186. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 38 (―In 1999, two venture capital (VC) firms 
invested $25 million in a newly formed Internet search firm called Google. 
Four years later, after Google‘s initial public offering (IPO), their investment 
was worth over $4 billion.‖). 
 187. Ari Levy, Accel Facebook Bet Poised To Become Biggest Venture Profit: 
Tech, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2012-01-18/accel-s-facebook-bet-poised-to-become-biggest 
-ever-venture-profit-tech (reporting that venture capital fund Accel Partners 
made a $12.2 million investment in Facebook in 2005 that had grown to be 
worth $10 billion in 2012). 
 188. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2008). 
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ed milestones projected by management.189 Staged financing is 
a highly potent method of addressing the three problems of en-
trepreneurial finance.190 It reduces information asymmetry by 
making entrepreneurs ―less likely to exaggerate a company‘s 
prospects in negotiating with a VC investor,‖191 and it reduces 
agency costs by providing ―a powerful incentive for managers to 
meet designated milestones in order to receive future financ-
ing.‖192 Can staged financing be used in crowdfunding? As will 
appear, a form of staged financing may indeed be relevant to 
the crowdfunding context, but likely only rarely. 
Formal staged financing will likely not play much of a role 
in crowdfunding. In theory, a crowdfunding intermediary could 
collect money from the crowd, and then dole it out to an issuer 
over time, contingent on hitting agreed-upon benchmarks. This 
idea has merit in the crowdfunding context, for all the same 
reasons it does in the VC world, but it is not clearly allowed 
under the JOBS Act. That statute directs crowdfunding inter-
mediaries to convey the offering proceeds to the issuer once it 
reaches its goal.193 The intermediary is not clearly authorized 
to hold back a portion of the funds.194 
An informal type of staged financing may nevertheless be 
used in the crowdfunding context, whereby crowdfunding com-
panies return to the crowd for financing year after year. A com-
pany could, for instance, seek to crowdfund $1 million per year 
for several years, and would promise the crowd that it would 
hit certain annual benchmarks. If it fails to meet the bench-
marks in a given year, it will surely find it difficult to convince 
the crowd to fund it for the next year. This places pressure on 
the management to meet the benchmarks, thereby ameliorat-
ing the trio of problems. 
The pressure on management will likely be much less in-
tense than in the VC context because the consequences of miss-
ing a set of benchmarks is much lower for crowdfunding man-
 
 189. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 949, 952 (1999). 
 190. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 179, at 171 (―Staged capital infusions 
are the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can employ.‖); 
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54. 
 191. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 52. 
 192. Id.; see also Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1413. 
 193. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012) (stating that intermediaries must 
―ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer‖ once it 
reaches its goal). 
 194. Nor is the intermediary clearly prohibited from doing so. 
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agers. In traditional VC staged financing, a legal promise of fu-
ture funding is conditioned on meeting the benchmarks. In this 
type of informal staged financing for crowdfunding, by contrast, 
each year‘s fundraising would be legally independent from eve-
ry other. Hitting the benchmarks in one year will merely raise 
the chances of successfully raising money next year; it does not 
oblige the crowd to continue financing the company. Thus the 
disciplining effect of staged financing, so powerful in the VC 
context, will be more moderate in the world of crowdfunding. 
In addition, it is unclear how many companies will engage 
in crowdfunding year after year. On the one hand, if the com-
pany goes out of business—a likely outcome for many crowd-
funded startups—then it will never return to the crowd. On the 
other hand, if the company succeeds, it may be able to meet its 
own financing needs from profits, or will have other sources of 
financing, such as bank loans. Only those companies that have 
neither crashed nor outgrown the crowd will return repeatedly. 
How many will fit that bill is hard to predict. 
In conclusion, informal staged financing holds some prom-
ise for at least some crowdfunding companies. 
 
2. Preferred Stock 
Most VC investments are in preferred stock,195 which is a 
security that gives the holder (the VC investor) various prefer-
ential economic rights, including most notably a ―liquidation 
preference‖ that would come into play in the event of the com-
pany‘s liquidation or sale.196 Preferred stock is generally con-
vertible to common stock at the election of the holder, and if the 
preferred stock has ―participation‖ rights, its holders may re-
ceive the preferred liquidation preference plus convert the pre-
ferred stock to common stock, thereby also ―participating‖ in 
the residual profits of the liquidated firm.197 
VCs are understood to use preferred stock to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and agency costs. The ex ante liquidation 
preference of preferred stock serves a signaling function that 
 
 195. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 138, at 875. 
 196. Bartlett, supra note 17, at 54. Other common rights include preferen-
tial dividend rights, redemption rights and antidilution protection. Id. 
 197. Id. The total value of preferred stock is equal to the liquidation prefer-
ence plus the expected value of any participation right. The liquidation prefer-
ence is much more easily observable because it is declared in the company‘s 
charter and the VC‘s stock purchase agreement, whereas the expected liquida-
tion value of common stock upon a trade sale is highly speculative. 
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helps investors identify promising entrepreneurs—information 
that is otherwise asymmetrically known. An entrepreneur who 
believes that the company will be worth more than the liquida-
tion preference would be willing to grant such a preference to 
an investor; an entrepreneur without such confidence would 
not.198 And as for the latter, the preferential rights held by the 
VC create an incentive for management to meet their financial 
projections.199 
Crowdfunding will not likely make much use of preferred 
stock because the cost of negotiating the liquidation preference, 
participation rights and dozens of other attributes is not feasi-
ble in this context. Preferred stock is a complex instrument 
with technical terms that are actively negotiated among VCs 
and entrepreneurs using expert counsel.200 But one of the foun-
dational purposes of crowdfunding is to be a simple securities 
market that poses extremely low costs of raising capital and is 
therefore accessible to a wide swath of early-stage entrepre-
neurs.201 Bespoke contract drafting by an attorney, especially 
an expert, will be far too costly for most crowdfunding ven-
tures.202 Even if it were affordable, there will be no one on the 
investor side to ask for convertible preferred stock or negotiate 
its provisions. 
Second, preferred stock is generally convertible to common 
stock at the option of the holder, so the problems that go with 
equity would apply here too. As I have discussed elsewhere, 
there are good reasons for startups to avoid selling common 
stock through crowdfunding.203 The sale of equity exposes 
founders to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty and 
empowers shareholders with the right to vote, demand books 
and records, and otherwise distracts management.204 For these 
reasons too, crowdfunding entrepreneurs are likely to sell some 
security other than convertible preferred stock. 
In short, preferred stock, though quite useful in the VC 
context, is not appropriate for use in crowdfunding. 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 55. 
 200. Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 633 n.239 (describing some of the key 
points of negotiation). 
 201. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1466–73; supra Part I.B.1. 
 202. Cf. Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 626. 
 203. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1483–87. 
 204. See id. 
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3. Control Rights 
As a mechanism for addressing agency costs, VCs routinely 
demand that they be granted certain powers of control, includ-
ing a seat on the board of directors and negative covenants giv-
ing the VC the power to veto important corporate actions.205 
These methods will not translate to crowdfunding. 
A seat on the board of directors must be occupied by a sin-
gle natural person, not a crowd.206 A VC fund manager may 
take the position herself or can easily designate such a person, 
but the coordination costs of having a crowd of digital share-
holders select a representative are likely too high to make it 
worthwhile. And even if the crowd were able to do so, entrepre-
neurs are unlikely to be interested. It is one thing to give a 
board seat to a VC fund manager whom the entrepreneur has 
come to know personally and gets along with. But it is quite 
another to simply take whomever the crowd selects. A VC‘s 
nominee is likely to have expertise and provide a benefit to the 
company, but this seems much less likely in the crowdfunding 
context. 
As for negative covenants, most entrepreneurs will be un-
willing to yield control to the crowd in this way for many of the 
same reasons that they will likely sell only a minority voting 
interest to the crowd.207 It may be reasonable to put the future 
of one‘s startup in the hands of an experienced VC fund man-
ager in exchange for millions of dollars of financing. By con-
trast, it is hard to imagine an entrepreneur allowing the crowd 
to control the startup‘s destiny for sums under $1 million.208 
In summary, control rights of the sort used by VCs to ad-
dress agency costs will play no role in crowdfunding. 
 
 205. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53. 
 206. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2015). But cf. Stephen M. Bain-
bridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2014) (―posit[ing] a novel alternative‖ to 
the rule that directors must be natural persons, namely that ―board services 
could be provided by other entities, be they partnerships, corporations, limited 
liability corporations, or any other type of business association‖). Were Bain-
bridge and Henderson‘s proposal to be adopted, crowdfunded companies could 
make good use of such ―board service providers.‖ Id. At this time, however, 
this remains a theoretical idea that has not been approved by any legislature. 
 207. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481–82. 
 208. One million dollars is the most a company is allowed to raise via 
crowdfunding in a year. See supra note 50. 
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4. Equity-Based Compensation 
Corporate managers can be compensated in a manner that 
addresses the fundamental problem of agency costs. One im-
portant method used by VCs is to pay management primarily 
in company stock, thereby making them into shareholders 
themselves.209 Compensating managers with common stock, 
and requiring them to hold it for some time, aligns the interests 
of the management with those of the VC investors in order to 
ameliorate agency costs.210 
Equity-based compensation of this sort is among the weak-
er mechanisms used by VCs. Moreover, it will not be relevant 
for at least a large swath of crowdfunding companies. First, 
there is good reason to expect that most crowdfunding entre-
preneurs will retain all or a majority of the equity in the com-
pany and sell debt or other securities to the crowd.211 Where a 
founder holds most of the equity, she is already incentivized to 
work hard for the company; ladling on even more would not 
seem to be worth the candle.212 Second, the design of an equity-
based compensation package is a complex and nuanced task. 
While it may make sense for sophisticated and experienced VCs 
to negotiate with an entrepreneur to develop a sensible equity-
based compensation package, it is likely an inappropriate tool 
for digital shareholders to employ. 
For these reasons, equity-based compensation will likely 
play a relatively small role in addressing agency costs at crowd-
funded companies. 
5. Geographic Proximity 
A final way in which VC firms respond to uncertainty, in-
formation asymmetry, and agency costs is by keeping their in-
vestments close to home.213 The industry is ―remarkably local-
 
 209. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53. See generally, e.g., LUCIAN BEB-
CHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). 
 210. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 53. 
 211. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1459–77 (predicting that most crowd-
funding entrepreneurs will sell debt or other non-equity securities to the 
crowd); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowd-
funding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 335, 360–61 (2012) (suggesting 
the use of ―unequity,‖ ―a particular type of financial interest that provides for 
profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a short-term basis, with no accompany-
ing governance rights‖). 
 212. The same is true if the entrepreneur holds a majority of the equity, 
though to a lesser extent. 
 213. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087. 
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ized,‖214 with Silicon Valley VCs investing in companies based 
in Northern California and New York VCs investing on the 
East Coast.215 This geographic concentration by VCs216 is an 
important method of addressing uncertainty and information 
asymmetry by enhancing the ability of the VC to conduct due 
diligence.217 Information asymmetry is further reduced by the 
reputation market that works well in a local community.218 Fi-
nally, geographic concentration enhances monitoring and thus 
helps address agency costs.219 
Geographic concentration will not be a terribly useful tech-
nique for crowdfunding to address the trio of problems.220 Pre-
liminarily, digital shareholders will come from every part of the 
country and will be allowed to invest anywhere they wish.221 
Many will surely spread their investments from coast-to-coast, 
as they do in reward crowdfunding.222 Be that as it may, at 
least some digital shareholders are likely to focus on companies 
local to their domicile. There may be such a group, as the vi-
brancy of the ―eat local‖ movement demonstrates.223 Indeed, the 
SEC‘s Regulation Crowdfunding specifically authorizes portals 
to focus on a certain geographic area.224  
Yet even for these sorts of digital shareholders who focus 
on a certain city or region, the reasons why VC investors use 
this method do not apply to them: digital shareholders will not 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286–87; see FLORIDA, supra note 97 (noting 
that VC investments are concentrated in particular regions). 
 216. And angel investors, as discussed infra Part III.B.3. 
 217. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 717, 730 (2010). 
 218. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1087. 
 219. See Ibrahim, supra note 217. 
 220. See Schwartz, supra note 5. For intrastate crowdfunding, the design is 
for a state-wide market. 
 221. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 222. See Ajay K. Agrawal et al., The Geography of Crowdfunding 1 (Nat‘l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) (―The geographic 
dispersion of investment evident in our data implies that [reward] crowdfund-
ing . . . largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions usually asso-
ciated with financing entrepreneurial ventures.‖). 
 223. See, e.g., JEFF KAGAN & PAIGE DOUGHTY, Eat Local, on 21ST CENTURY 
ENERGY SUPERHEROES (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
ihULIlqnelE (children‘s song encouraging them to ―eat local‖). 
 224. A portal may limit listings to those from a certain geographic location. 
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (notice 
of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 227.402(b)(2)(ii)). 
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do much, if any, physical due diligence,225 will not sit on boards 
of directors, and generally will not be able to monitor the way 
that VCs do, even if they live close by.226 Even assuming that 
some local investors may be familiar with neighborhoods and 
local needs (e.g., they know that a certain block already has 
three coffee shops), this effect is quite modest compared with 
the benefits that VCs obtain from geographic proximity in 
terms of reducing uncertainty, information asymmetry and 
agency costs.227 
In short, geographic concentration will not translate well 
from the VC to the crowdfunding context. 
B. SOLUTIONS FROM ANGEL INVESTING 
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who finance 
startups with their own funds at a very early stage of their de-
velopment, even earlier than VCs.228 The nature of such in-
vestments is that they present extremely high levels of uncer-
tainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. These three 
problems present themselves in much the same way as in 
VC,229 but in an even more severe form because angels invest in 
startups at an earlier stage.230 
One might expect angels to follow the lead of VCs and em-
ploy the various techniques just described to address uncer-
tainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.231 It turns 
out, however, that angel investors utilize a different set of solu-
tions that suit their distinctive institutional context.232 Angels 
eschew the comprehensive, detailed, and powerful investment 
contracts used by VCs, instead opting for simple contracts with 
few formal investor protections.233 According to the literature, 
angels rely primarily on technical expertise, geographic proxim-
ity, and active participation to address uncertainty, infor-
mation asymmetry, and agency costs.234 This Section examines 
these methods of responding to the trio of problems and their 
 
 225. Cf. infra text accompanying note 454 (indicating that Google Maps 
―Street View‖ can be used as a partial substitute for physical due diligence). 
 226. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 227. See infra Part III.C.5. 
 228. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1406.  
 229. See supra Part III.A. 
 230. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1420.  
 231. See id.  
 232. See id. at 1422–24. 
 233. See id. at 1422. 
 234. For an example of such literature, see Ibrahim, supra note 188.  
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potential application to crowdfunding. Crowdfunding presents 
a completely different institutional context than that of tradi-
tional angel investing, and the techniques used by angels will 
not translate directly to crowdfunding. 
1. Technical Expertise 
Angel investors generally invest in areas in which they 
have technical expertise.235 Many angels are themselves ex-
entrepreneurs who focus their investments on the industry that 
they know and previously succeeded in.236 Technical expertise 
has proved to be a powerful method of addressing all three fun-
damental problems of investing. The angel‘s expertise ―reduces 
uncertainty by allowing the angel to better gauge the start-up‘s 
chances for success‖ and it ―reduces information asymmetry by 
minimizing the entrepreneur‘s advantage of private infor-
mation.‖237 It also responds to agency costs by enhancing the 
ability of the angel to thoughtfully monitor management‘s 
technical progress.238 
This method of addressing the trio of problems has little 
direct relevance for crowdfunding. Digital shareholders will be 
ordinary people from all walks of life.239 Compared to wealthy 
financiers and engineers from the likes of MIT and Stanford,240 
lay people are much less able to employ expertise as a tool to 
respond to the trio of problems. This idea of technical expertise 
thus does not directly apply to crowdfunding. However, if we 
take the concept of expertise broadly, it may hold some prom-
ise. 
As Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek famously taught, 
everyone from every background does indeed have expertise—
―expertise‖ in the sense of knowing something valuable that is 
not generally known.241 Science is ―not the sum of all 
knowledge,‖ wrote Hayek.242 Rather, there is another body of 
―very important but unorganized knowledge‖: the dispersed bits 
of information that each person happens to know because of 
 
 235. See Fisch, supra note 29, at 86; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1431–32. 
 236. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1419. 
 237. Id. at 1431–32.  
 238. See id. at 1431 (discussing how the relationship between angels and 
entrepreneurs reduces agency costs). 
 239. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 240. See Ibrahim, supra note 217, at 729.  
 241. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
(1945). 
 242. Id. at 521. 
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their unique experience, skills, and perspective, what Hayek 
called ―the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place.‖243 Thanks to this sort of expertise, every individual 
―has some advantage over all others because he possesses 
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but 
of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it 
are left to him or are made with his active cooperation.‖244 
Hayek‘s ideas describe crowdfunding well. Various digital 
shareholders will hold different bits of useful information relat-
ing to crowdfunding companies, and they can choose to make 
beneficial use of that information.245 For example, avid video 
gamers are familiar with what makes a good game and other 
aspects of the business in a way that few others could match.246 
Thus a video game aficionado may focus all her crowdfunding 
investments on video games. She would reduce uncertainty and 
information asymmetry by sticking to her area of expertise 
(video games) and would be able to monitor the progress of the 
business in a thoughtful way. For example, she could volunteer 
to be an early beta-tester of the game and, after playing it for a 
few days, understand deeply how it stacks up against the com-
petition on numerous dimensions. 
Other examples can be given: fitness instructors can spot a 
promising exercise machine; home cooks know what small ap-
pliances might succeed. None of these types of knowledge can 
really be called technical expertise, but the point is that they 
can nevertheless be used by digital shareholders in a manner 
akin to the use of technical expertise by angel investors.247 
To summarize, technical expertise as used by angel inves-
tors is not directly applicable to crowdfunding. Expertise broad-
ly construed in the Hayekian sense, however, is indeed an ap-
propriate method for digital shareholders to employ. 
2. Active Participation 
After angels make their investments, they ―actively partic-
 
 243. Id. at 521–22 (referring to the same idea as ―knowledge of people, of 
local conditions, and of special circumstances‖). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Dorff, supra note 14 (stating that crowdfunders can use their rele-
vant personal experiences to invest).  
 246. Cf. Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 597 (explaining why a group of video 
game players would be better able to predict a video game‘s success than VC 
investors).  
 247. These forms of expertise can also be shared with the crowd through 
crowdfunded investment analysis. See infra Part IV.B. 
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ipate‖ in the business.248 They make ―regular visits to the start-
up‘s facilities,‖ and advise management.249 This sort of active 
participation in the day-to-day operation of the company is 
highly analogous to the VC practice of taking a seat on the 
board of directors, just less formal.250 It allows for close moni-
toring of management and is a key method of reducing agency 
costs for angel investors.251 To put it simply: it‘s hard to slack 
off when a large investor is present in the room. 
Active participation in the business is clearly inappropriate 
for crowdfunding.252 Digital shareholders will be passive inves-
tors—more like public shareholders than angels. Each will 
have a small stake,253 making it economically irrational for any 
one of them to put time and effort into helping run the busi-
ness. More importantly, it is hard to imagine that entrepre-
neurs will even allow digital shareholders to physically come 
down to the office. Unlike an experienced angel investor,254 the 
crowd would not be helpful in close quarters. 
In short, active participation will not translate to crowd-
funding. 
3. Geographic Proximity 
Because of the active participation that angels practice, 
and because the opportunities they pursue are based on per-
sonal connections, angel investing is a highly localized endeav-
or, even more than VC.255 ―Angel groups commonly have ‗local‘ 
names, like the ‗Pasadena Angels‘ or the ‗New York Angels,‘ 
and they tend to invest‖ exclusively in local startups.256 
But just as in the VC context,257 geographic proximity will 
likely not be a particularly important method for addressing 
the trio of problems as they will arise in crowdfunding. Digital 
shareholders will not find opportunities from personal connec-
tions; opportunities will be presented on Internet portals.258 
 
 248. Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433. 
 249. Id.  
 250. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 251. See Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1433.  
 252. See Dorff, supra note 14, at 515.  
 253. See id. 
 254. See Cable, supra note 140, at 116. 
 255. See id.; Ibrahim, supra note 188, at 1432.  
 256. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286–87. 
 257. See supra Part III.A.5. 
 258. Other types of investors benefit from ―network[s] of trust.‖ Ibrahim, 
supra note 188, at 1432. 
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And digital shareholders will not actively participate in the 
business, as just discussed.259 There may be some role for local 
knowledge, as discussed in Part III.A.5 above, but for the most 
part, geographic proximity will not be appropriate for crowd-
funding. 
C. SOLUTIONS FROM PUBLIC COMPANIES 
The most traditional form of entrepreneurial finance is 
when a company ―goes public‖ in an initial public offering 
(IPO).260 Examples of recent IPO firms include camera-maker 
GoPro, video game producer King Digital Entertainment (best 
known for Candy Crush Saga), and restaurant chain Noodles & 
Company. Public companies are generally more mature than 
those funded by angels or VCs, but they typically are still in an 
early stage of their growth, with an average age of about five to 
ten years.261 Thus just like in the VC and angel context, public 
companies have had to respond to the three fundamental prob-
lems of entrepreneurial finance: uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and agency costs. 
Agency costs are the primary problem for public companies 
to overcome.262 Uncertainty and information asymmetry are 
somewhat less problematic because such companies generally 
have years of operating history for investors to review.263 Thus, 
most of the important techniques used by public companies are 
aimed specifically at addressing agency costs. 
The solutions that have been adopted in the public compa-
ny context differ radically from those used by VCs and an-
gels.264 The key mechanisms, in roughly the order of im-
portance, are mandatory disclosure, takeovers, derivative 
actions, activist shareholders, equity-based compensation, 
proxy contests, and appraisal. As in the previous two Sections, 
 
 259. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 260. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 237, 245 (2015) (describing the IPO process). 
 261. See IPO TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, REBUILDING THE 
IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK 
ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 6 (2011). 
 262. See generally Geis, supra note 162, at 973–82 (engaging in a compre-
hensive discussion of agency costs as a problem for public companies).  
 263. Uncertainty and information asymmetry are still quite significant in 
the context of public companies. See Black, supra note 147, at 786 (―[A] com-
pany‘s shares, when the company first goes public, are like an unobservable 
car, produced by an unknown manufacturer, on which investors can obtain 
only dry, written information that they can‘t directly verify.‖). 
 264. See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
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these methods generally hold very little relevance for crowd-
funding. 
1. Mandatory Disclosure 
At the time of an IPO, the issuing company is legally re-
quired under the ‗33 Act to provide full and clear disclosure 
about the company and the potential risks and rewards of in-
vesting in the securities.265 Once the securities begin trading on 
a secondary market, the ‗34 Act requires the issuing company 
to provide the public with ongoing, regular, and event-based 
disclosures.266 Mandatory disclosure addresses both infor-
mation asymmetry and agency costs in public companies. The 
insiders who know lots of information about the company must 
share that information with the public, thus reducing infor-
mation asymmetry.267 And publishing important corporate in-
formation on the Internet (and before the Internet, on paper) 
lowers the cost of monitoring for all shareholders and empow-
ers them to protect themselves against harmful agency costs.268 
The signature move of the JOBS Act, however, is to exempt 
crowdfunded securities from that traditional system of manda-
tory disclosure (in order to lower transaction costs for issu-
ers).269 Furthermore, traditional public companies must report 
to investors at least quarterly, while crowdfunding companies 
need only provide a single, simple annual report.270 Hence, the 
traditional method of addressing information asymmetry and 
agency costs through mandatory disclosure will not directly ap-
ply to crowdfunding. 
Even so, there do remain some potentially significant dis-
closure obligations in the CROWDFUND Act.271 The issuer 
must file with the SEC, and make available to the relevant 
funding portal and potential investors, a disclosure document 
 
 265. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2012); id. § 77f. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN, 
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 110–59 (Thomson West 5th ed. 2006). 
 266. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and 
Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003). 
 267. See id.; see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET 70 (Northeastern Univ. Press rev. ed. 1995) (claiming the primary 
function of the Securities Act of 1933 is to address information asymmetry).  
 268. See Paredes, supra note 266.  
 269. For a more thorough discussion of the JOBS Act‘s effects on mandato-
ry disclosure see Berdejó, supra note 92, at 22–32. 
 270. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4). 
 271. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 (describing the CROWD-
FUND Act as imposing ―a quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both 
issuers and any intermediaries‖). 
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consisting of information about the business, its financial situa-
tion, and the offering.272 Beyond the initial sale of securities, 
the CROWDFUND Act creates a duty to provide investors and 
the SEC an annual report of a similar level as the original fil-
ing.273 It is hard to say in advance how lengthy and detailed the 
crowdfunding disclosures will be,274 but one thing is certain: 
they will be only a tiny fraction as lengthy or detailed as the 
disclosures found in the contemporary public company con-
text.275 Crowdfunding disclosures will probably be short and 
non-specific, and the crowd is likely to find as much infor-
mation among themselves,276 or through their collective re-
search,277 as will be disclosed by the companies. 
For these reasons, mandatory disclosure will not be highly 
relevant to addressing the trio of problems for crowdfunding. 
2. Proxy Contests 
Proxy contests address agency costs in public companies as 
the possibility of being voted out by the shareholders helps 
keep the board accountable in a manner akin to politicians. 
Such elections are often routine affairs, where the outgoing 
board nominates itself for another term and the shareholders 
approve, but sometimes an insurgent group challenges the in-
cumbent board to a contested election (a proxy contest)278 
where the shareholders ultimately decide by majority vote.279 
 
 272. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1). 
 273. Id. § 77d-1(b)(4). 
 274. Cf. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,540 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239–40, 249) (estimating that the ―burden to prepare and file‖ a 
crowdfunding issuer disclosure form would be approximately 60 hours).  
 275. It is also an open question whether digital shareholders will read or 
understand these disclosures, in part because they will likely be investing only 
a small amount of money in each company, rendering it irrational to spend 
significant time and effort learning about each one. See generally OMRI BEN-
SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE 
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 6 (2014) (―Mandated disclosure is allur-
ing, but it routinely fails to achieve its ambitious goals.‖); Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of 
the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 
168 (2011) (reporting on empirical finding that less than 1% of users read end 
user license agreements, or EULAs, for software sold online). 
 276. See infra Part IV.A. 
 277. See infra Part IV.B. 
 278. Public shareholders generally vote via written proxy. See Schwartz, 
supra note 3, at 1477–79 (providing further background information on proxy 
contests).  
 279. See, e.g., Julie Jargon et al., New Board Will Set Darden’s Menu—
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Proxy contests require a majority voting stake dispersed 
among the public, yet very few crowdfunding entrepreneurs 
will sell a majority of the voting shares to the crowd.280 Much 
more commonly, the entrepreneur will maintain voting control 
herself, making a proxy contest a mathematical impossibility. 
Entrepreneurs will keep control to avoid the possibility of a 
proxy contest and also to smooth the road for potential future 
rounds of funding.281 Indeed, this author has suggested that 
crowdfunding companies are likely to avoid selling any equity 
at all to the crowd, instead offering them debt or other securi-
ties.282 
To summarize: proxy contests will not be a relevant meth-
od for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies be-
cause crowdfunded companies will rarely sell a majority of the 
voting shares to the crowd.283 
3. Takeovers 
The threat of a takeover bid is widely viewed as among the 
most important means of addressing agency costs in public 
companies.284 It is unlikely to have the same effect for crowd-
funding companies, however. 
When corporate voting power is widely dispersed among 
many shareholders, a third party can buy up 51% through a 
tender offer, putting herself in position to select the board and 
control the corporation. From the perspective of the incumbent 
management, who commonly lose their positions, all of this is 
generally seen as hostile, hence the term ―hostile takeover.‖ 
But management can avoid being taken over and replaced by 
keeping the share price high and rising over the long run, the 
upshot being that the threat of a takeover bid disciplines man-
agers to put forth great effort to raise the share price, an out-
come welcomed by shareholders.285 
 
Activist Starboard Wins a Unique Victory, Replacing Restaurant Company’s 
Entire Set of 12 Directors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2014, at B3 (reporting on a 
successful proxy contest). 
 280. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1481–82. 
 281. See id. at 1481. 
 282. Id. at 1482–89. 
 283. In the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does sell a 
majority of the voting power, perhaps by allowing cumulative voting, a proxy 
contest among the crowd may actually be more viable than in the public com-
pany context. Id. at 1477–79. 
 284. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965). 
 285. See id. at 112; see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF EN-
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The discipline of takeovers cannot be translated from tra-
ditional public companies to crowdfunded ones. As in the case 
of proxy contests,286 most crowdfunded companies will likely 
sell only a minority interest to the crowd, rendering a takeover 
impossible.287 In addition, there will likely be only a very lim-
ited and illiquid secondary market for crowdfunded securi-
ties.288 
4. Derivative Actions 
Shareholder derivative actions play a significant role in re-
sponding to agency costs for public companies, but they are un-
likely to hold the same import for crowdfunding companies. 
Corporate officials owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
to their corporation, as elaborated in case law. These legal obli-
gations should be, and generally are, taken seriously by such 
officials. But if a ―corporate official violates any of the duties he 
or she owes to the corporation, and the board of directors fails 
to take appropriate action, American law recognizes the right of 
a shareholder to sue in the corporation‘s behalf to redress the 
injury.‖289 This type of lawsuit is called a ―derivative‖ action be-
cause the shareholder‘s capacity to sue the official derives from 
the corporation. Similarly, any recovery in a derivative action 
goes to the corporation. Shareholder-plaintiffs regularly file de-
rivative actions against the directors and senior management 
of traditional public companies, especially in certain situations, 
such as mergers.290 Institutional shareholders may have 
 
TERPRISE 58 (1996) (oberving that threat of takeover helps keep corporate 
management faithful to the corporation). 
 286. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 287. Again, in the (likely rare) case where a crowdfunding company does 
sell a majority of the voting power, takeover bidders will apparently be free to 
engage in at least some coercive tactics that would be unlawful were they at-
tempted with registered securities as they would be unfettered by the Wil-
liams Act, the federal law that governs tender offers for registered securities. 
See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1480. 
 288. Id. at 1463 (―[A]s a practical matter there will be a very small second-
ary market for any given crowdfunded security. This is simply because the 
number of shares in the marketplace is likely to be orders of magnitude small-
er for a crowdfunded issue than a registered one. Publicly traded companies 
issue millions or even billions of shares, making it easy to find someone who 
wants to buy or sell a few. Crowdfunded companies, by contrast, are likely to 
have only thousands of securities outstanding, making it difficult and expen-
sive to transact in them. For this reason, no liquid secondary market is likely 
to develop in crowdfunded securities.‖). 
 289. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 207. 
 290. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Mer-
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enough money at stake to make a derivative action sensible, 
and plaintiff-side attorneys have strong incentives (i.e., fees 
paid by the corporation) to bring such actions. In the public 
company context, in short, derivative actions (including the 
threat of them) help discipline corporate management to act as 
faithful agents of the corporation. 
In the crowdfunding context, shareholder derivative ac-
tions are likely to be of little use, simply because there will be 
so much less money at stake. The shareholders will likely be 
dispersed, each holding a few shares, making it economically 
unreasonable for any one of them to spend their own time and 
money bringing a derivative action that would benefit the cor-
poration as a whole. And as for attorneys themselves, the fees 
in public company derivative litigation regularly amount to 
millions of dollars, so landing just a portion of such work can 
maintain a practice.291 For crowdfunded companies, where the 
maximum total fundraising allowed is $1 million, any attor-
neys‘ fees awarded in derivative litigation will surely amount to 
only a fraction of that available in the traditional public com-
pany litigation. 
Hence derivative litigation is not likely to be a consequen-
tial method of addressing agency costs in crowdfunded compa-
nies. 
5. Activist Shareholders 
Traditionally, many public shareholders were widely dis-
persed, meaning that no single shareholder held enough of a 
stake to make careful monitoring worthwhile.292 That may have 
been true in the 1930s, but it no longer describes the contempo-
rary world, where a small group of institutional investors hold 
70% of outstanding stock in our major corporations, generally 
on behalf of the ultimate beneficial owners.293 Most of these in-
stitutional investors are generally passive—but not all. 
So-called ―activist‖ investors find a promising target, buy 
up a large stake,294 and then present management with ideas 
 
ger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. 557, 557–59 (2015) (―Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mer-
gers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%.‖). 
 291. See Adam B. Badawi & Daniel Chen, The Shareholder Wealth Effects 
of Delaware Litigation (Sept. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://users 
.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Delaware.pdf.  
 292. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 166, at 47–65. 
 293. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123. 
 294. Id. at 900 n.123 (―The activist shareholder‘s predisclosure acquisition 
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to raise the value of their shares.295 By monitoring and advising 
management, activist investors can help reduce agency costs at 
public companies. And if their concerns are not met, activists 
can use hardball tactics, such as a proxy fight, to convince or 
force management to accept their intervention.296 
Activist investing will not be appropriate for crowdfunding. 
First, there is not enough money involved. The model of activist 
investing is that they need a large initial investment to give 
them the economic motivation to engage a target and try to 
raise its value.297 Yet the amounts at stake in crowdfunded 
companies will likely be too small for activists to bother with. 
The maximum amount a crowdfunding company can issue is $1 
million, but the usual toeholds by public company activists are 
many times that total amount. Second, there is unlikely to be 
much of a secondary market for crowdfunded securities, and 
definitely not one as deep and liquid as for traditional public 
companies.298 
In short, activist investing will not be a useful mechanism 
for addressing agency costs in crowdfunded companies. 
6. Equity-Based Compensation 
Public companies use equity-based compensation to ad-
dress agency costs.299 Paying senior executives a significant 
portion of their compensation in stock or stock options is de-
signed to align the executives‘ personal interest with that of the 
company as a whole.300 If the company becomes more valuable, 
the stock price rises, and the executive‘s pay increases; if the 
share price drops, her pay will decrease. The precise way in 
 
of a significant toehold is critical to its business model.‖). 
 295. Id. at 896 (explaining that activists aim to ―identify strategic and gov-
ernance shortfalls with significant valuation consequences, to acquire a posi-
tion in a company with governance-related underperformance, and then to 
present reticent institutions with their value proposition: a specified change in 
the portfolio company‘s strategy or structure‖). 
 296. See, e.g., Jargon et al., supra note 279. 
 297. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 123, at 902–04 (describing the im-
portance of a substantial ―toehold‖ investment). 
 298. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 (―[T]here will be a very small sec-
ondary market for any given crowdfunded security.‖); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d-1(e) (2012) (restricting the secondary market for crowdfunded securi-
ties). 
 299. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extrac-
tion in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753–54 
(2002). 
 300. This is very similar to the rationale for equity-based compensation in 
the VC context. See supra Part III.A.4. 
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which public companies use equity-based compensation varies 
and is the subject of significant scholarly attention.301 How long 
should the executive have to hold on to the stock?302 Should the 
strike price ever be reset?303 For present purposes it is suffi-
cient to observe that equity-based compensation is a widely 
used technique among public companies to address agency 
costs, and that there is a deep and well-established literature 
on best practices in doing so.304 
Even so, equity-based compensation will not translate well 
to the crowdfunding context for the same reasons discussed in 
Part III.A.4. Management will likely already hold most or all of 
the equity in the company, meaning that any additional incen-
tive from equity-based compensation will be modest. 
7. Appraisal and Weinberger 
Finally, appraisal and so-called Weinberger305 actions are 
both important mechanisms for addressing agency costs in pub-
lic companies. Indeed, ―appraisal arbitrage‖ has lately become a 
darling among hedge funds, who buy up shares for the express 
purpose of pursuing appraisal.306 And Weinberger cases contin-
ue to make headlines.307 
Appraisal and Weinberger are both used to contain a con-
trolling shareholder who might otherwise act opportunistically 
toward the minority shareholders.308 For a variety of reasons, 
 
 301. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 209; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the 
Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 (2009). 
 302. E.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 301 (suggesting that executives be 
forced to hold company stock for two to four years after leaving the firm). 
 303. Google famously reset employees‘ stock option strike price in 2009 af-
ter a 50% drop in the share price. See Martin Peers, Google’s Optional Wind-
fall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2009, at C10. 
 304. See, e.g., David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 697–708 (2004) (summarizing literature on equity-based 
compensation). 
 305. Named after Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 306. See Liz Hoffman, Risky Legal Ploy Seeks to Milk Buyouts, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 14, 2014, at C1 (reporting on the ―rise of ‗appraisal arbitrage,‘ in which 
hedge funds buy shares of companies on the brink of a buyout and ask a judge 
to award them a higher price‖). 
 307. E.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Judge Finds Chief of Dole Fraudulently 
Drove Down Its Stock Price Before Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2015, at B6 
(reporting on a high-profile Weinberger action involving Dole Food Co. that re-
sulted in a $148 million judgment against two individuals). 
 308. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705 (A ―majority shareholder . . . owe[s] a fi-
duciary responsibility to . . . [the] minority.‖). 
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controlling shareholders commonly seek to eject the minority 
shareholders without their consent through a so-called ―cash-
out merger,‖ the result of which is that the majority sharehold-
er winds up with 100% of the shares, and the other sharehold-
ers end up with cash.309 A cash-out merger can be used equita-
bly, but it can also be abused by a controlling shareholder that 
tries to cash out the minority for a pittance. The law allows a 
special remedy for shareholders who feel that the cash out price 
they were offered was unfairly low: appraisal.310 An appraisal 
action is a trial-like proceeding in which the court takes evi-
dence and ultimately awards the shareholder the ―fair value‖ of 
her shares.311 And for those who prefer, they can bring a Wein-
berger312-type action claiming that the majority violated its fi-
duciary duty by offering an unfair price or running an unfair 
process. 
The mere presence of appraisal and Weinberger helps dis-
courage majority shareholders from cashing people out at an 
unfairly low price in the first place. Can this translate from the 
public company context to the crowdfunding context? Perhaps. 
Digital shareholders clearly face a risk of being treated inequi-
tably by a controlling shareholder, the situation to which ap-
praisal and Weinberger relate.313 Appraisal and Weinberger re-
spond directly to these sorts of issues314 and may prove useful 
for digital shareholders.315 On the other hand, they may not be 
 
 309. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 215. 
 310. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015). 
 311. This amount may be higher or lower than the original cash-out offer. 
Id. 
 312. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701. 
 313. See Wroldsen, supra note 13, at 612 (describing inter-shareholder con-
flict). 
 314. Another potentially relevant rule of corporate law is the line of doc-
trine holding that shareholders of closely held corporations owe each other fi-
duciary duties, whose seminal case is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
 315. One might reasonably ask why the problem of an insufficient pool for 
attorneys‘ fees will not pose a problem in the context of appraisal or Wein-
berger actions, when such a problem was previously discussed in connection 
with derivative actions. See supra Part III.C.4. One answer is that appraisal 
and Weinberger cases will generally arise among successful companies, includ-
ing those that obtain venture capital or other sources of funding beyond the 
crowd, meaning more money will be at stake. Also, the issue will be the fair 
value of the shares, and that represents a unique opportunity for substantial 
awards that is not similarly present in ordinary derivative actions, which may 
relate to much smaller concerns with subsequently small damage awards. 
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cost-effective for small startups where there is a relatively 
small amount at stake. 
In short, appraisal and Weinberger may be utilized by digi-
tal shareholders to address agency costs in crowdfunded com-
panies, but these are relatively weak mechanisms. 
This Part asked whether any of the traditional solutions 
used by VCs, angels, and public shareholders to address the 
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance can be 
applied to crowdfunding. It showed that most of the traditional 
techniques, including the most powerful of them, hold little rel-
evance for crowdfunding. As such, the next and final Part in-
troduces a number of new and different methods—ones not cur-
rently in use by VCs, angels or public shareholders—that can 
effectively address the three problems in the distinctive digital 
context of crowdfunding. 
 
 
IV.  DIGITAL METHODS TO ADDRESS THE THREE 
PROBLEMS IN CROWDFUNDING   
Crowdfunding will take place in a lightly regulated316 digi-
tal space that is new and different from the familiar worlds of 
VC, angels, and public companies, and thus needs new and ad-
ditional responses to the fundamental problems of uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs. This Part proposes 
for crowdfunding a set of novel solutions to the trio of problems; 
novel in the sense that they are not currently employed in VC, 
angel investing, or public companies. These proposed solutions 
are all meant to suit the institutional context of crowdfunding, 
where digital shareholders will interact with companies via the 
Internet.317 
 
 316. The regulatory burden is light compared to traditional public offer-
ings. It may not be light in an absolute sense, and numerous commentators 
believe the regulatory obligations will be insurmountably high. See, e.g., Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale 
of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a 
Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 867 (2013–2014) (―The provisions of the 
CROWDFUND Act . . . create a significant cost structure that is not likely to 
be outweighed by the benefits of a crowdfunded offering conducted under the 
Act . . . .‖); Hurt, supra note 16, at 252–54 (―Equity Crowdfunding Is Doomed 
Because Section 4(6) Is Too Costly and Burdensome on Issuers and Portals‖); 
Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12, at 1605–06 (―[T]he regulatory costs 
are likely to take too much of the small amount of money that can be raised.‖). 
 317. It must be acknowledged that ―the Internet‖ as we now understand it 
could and probably will continue to change and evolve in unpredictable ways. 
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These five mechanisms are presented in the rough chrono-
logical order of when each would be called upon in the life of a 
crowdfunded company. The wisdom of the crowd (Part IV.A) 
and the crowdsourcing of information (Part IV.B) will be most 
relevant when a company launches a crowdfunding campaign 
and potential investors are deciding whether to invest. Online 
reputation (Part IV.C) and securities-based compensation (Part 
IV.D) come into play both during the campaign and after the 
company receives the money. Digital monitoring (Part IV.E) is 
mainly important after the company receives the funds. 
A. THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD 
Investing in startups with no track record through online 
crowdfunding presents tremendous uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetries for investors. How should a potential 
crowdfunding investor pick which company to invest in? She 
would like to invest in one that will succeed, yet she knows that 
she cannot accurately predict how a set of startup companies 
will turn out—and she is surely right on that score. But re-
search has shown that large groups of people—crowds—can col-
lectively do a pretty good job at forecasting the future, regard-
less of whether the crowd is rational or comprised of experts.318 
This ―wisdom of the crowd‖ has a clear and important applica-
tion to crowdfunding where it can be a powerful tool to address 
both uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
A well-established body of scientific literature shows that 
groups are better at finding facts and making predictions than 
lone individuals, even experts.319 Moreover, this phenomenon is 
 
For example, there was a time when most people experienced the Internet 
through browsers and the worldwide web; these days, smartphones and apps 
have become the norm. Future changes to the Internet are likely and impossi-
ble to predict, so this Part does not intend to suggest an exhaustive list. Ra-
ther, other effective solutions, beyond those presented in this Part or presently 
conceivable to this author, will likely arise as a ―[product] of human action, but 
not the result of human design.‖ FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 7 (1948). 
 318. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xiii–xiv, 29–32 (―Even if most of the 
people within a group are not especially well-informed or rational, it can still 
reach a collectively wise decision.‖). 
 319. See, e.g., id. at 31–32 (―[A] large group of diverse individuals will come 
up with better and more robust forecasts and make more intelligent decisions 
than even the most skilled [individual acting alone].‖); Karsten Hueffer et al., 
The Wisdom of Crowds: Predicting a Weather and Climate-Related Event, 8 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 91, 91 (Mar. 2013). For crowdfunding, where 
investors will have to gauge the future performance of various startup compa-
nies, predictions will be more important than fact-finding. 
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enhanced when people have a financial stake in being right,320 
as will be the case in crowdfunding. Because they will be risk-
ing their own money, potential investors will take the exercise 
seriously.321 
This wisdom of crowds can be seen in numerous fields.322 
For one example, the Iowa Electronic Markets—an online fu-
tures market where traders buy and sell contracts whose pay-
offs depend on the outcome of elections and other events—have 
been able to predict presidential and other elections more accu-
rately than traditional polls.323 For another, consider the Ne-
nana Ice Classic, an annual betting pool dating from 1917 
where Alaskans try to predict the exact date and time when the 
ice covering the Tanana River will break up, marking the start 
of spring.324 It turns out that the average of all the participants‘ 
predictions is at least as accurate as any expert model in fore-
casting the ice break up.325 Many other examples of the wisdom 
of the crowd could be given. 
The wisdom of the crowd is not due to some mystical phe-
nomenon or mental convergence, but rather a simple mathe-
matical consequence of averaging.326 If one person guesses too 
high and another too low, their average response is spot on.327 
But the crowd is not necessarily wise; it depends on the crowd 
being sufficiently diverse in terms of their knowledge, skills 
and perspectives.328 A crowd of like-minded people will do no 
better than an individual because they ―share the same exper-
tise—and the same blindspots. . . . From a wisdom-of-crowds 
perspective, it is as if you do not have a crowd.‖329 
 
 320. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS 
FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING ix–x (2007). 
 321. See id. 
 322. See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 114. 
 323. Id. at 17–19. 
 324. Hueffer et al., supra note 319, at 92. 
 325. Id. at 93. 
 326. Richard P. Larrick et al., The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of 
Crowds, in SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227, 229 (Joachim I. 
Krueger ed., 2012) (―Combining judgments takes individual imperfection and 
smoothes the rough edges to isolate the collective‘s view of the truth. Or, to 
put it more mathematically and mundanely, averaging cancels error.‖). 
 327. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 5 (explaining that aggregating 
and averaging a group‘s individual guesses is likely to produce good results). 
 328. See Hueffer et al., supra note 319 (―[G]roups can be more accurate 
than most individuals to the extent to which each group is diverse.‖). The rele-
vant type of diversity is cognitive, not sociological. See SUROWIECKI, supra 
note 114, at 183. 
 329. Larrick et al., supra note 326, at 231; see SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, 
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A diverse crowd, by contrast, is a potent force for discover-
ing hidden truths and forecasting uncertain outcomes. This 
goes back to the reason why the wisdom of the crowd effect ex-
ists in the first place: averaging. Diverse people will make dif-
ferent mistakes, which in the aggregate will encircle the truth. 
A homogenous crowd will all make the same mistakes, so even 
their average answer will be off the mark. For instance, when 
forecasting a given outcome, a crowd made up of optimists will 
consistently overestimate it,330 but a group made up of opti-
mists, pessimists, and realists will, on average, get close to the 
truth. 
Crowdfunding is well positioned to capitalize on the wis-
dom of crowds.331 Once it commences, crowdfunding will gather 
together a large group of investors on Internet portals to collec-
tively judge the prospects of the various startups seeking fund-
ing. Importantly, this crowd will likely be a diverse one for all 
the reasons discussed above in Part I.B.2. It will include digital 
shareholders of every age, ethnicity, gender, geography, etc. 
Diversity of perspectives is the key to the success of the wisdom 
of the crowd,332 and it should work well for crowdfunding.333 
On crowdfunding portals, each investor will select the in-
vestments that seem most promising to her. Over time, as the 
crowd of investors weighs in, some companies will prove popu-
lar with the crowd, others not so. The net effect will be a collec-
tive prediction of which investments opportunities are the most 
attractive, like a stock exchange with no securities analysts, no 
CNBC, and no Wall Street Journal.334 One might expect chaos 
 
at 36–39 (discussing ―groupthink‖). 
 330. As a possible example, the Federal Reserve‘s forecast for economic 
growth was significantly higher than the growth that eventuated in each of 
the past five years. Dylan Matthews, This Graph Shows How Bad the Fed Is 
at Predicting the Future, WONKBLOG (June 19, 2013), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/19/this-graph-shows-how-bad 
-the-fed-is-at-predicting-the-future. 
 331. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 12 (―Enthusiasts for crowd-
funding stressed that Internet offerings would harness the ‗wisdom of the 
crowds‘ to separate the good business plans from the deficient (or corrupt).‖). 
 332. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 183 (―I mean not sociological di-
versity but rather cognitive diversity.‖). 
 333. This is not a certainty. It is possible that the crowd that forms on 
crowdfunding portals will be single-minded and foolish, rather than diverse 
and wise, but the open nature of the form indicates that the latter is more like-
ly. 
 334. Admittedly, this collective prediction will surely be imperfect and at 
least some poor prospects will receive funding. The idea is merely that, on av-
erage, there is wisdom in the crowd‘s predictions. 
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and anarchy, but the ―wisdom of the crowd‖ theory suggests 
that digital shareholders will do a relatively good job at picking 
winners.335 
Few digital shareholders will be experts on any field in 
which they might invest, but all of them will be able to add 
something to the collective effort. Information, as Friedrich 
Hayek famously explained, is not concentrated in some central 
repository.336 Rather, the information needed to transact, build 
companies and generate economic growth is splintered among 
countless people, each of whom only holds a small piece of it.337 
By coming together on crowdfunding portals, members of the 
crowd will each contribute the piece that they have. 
Admittedly, predicting how startup companies will perform 
is more complex and open-ended than predicting who will win 
an election338 or when the ice will break up.339 But the wisdom 
of the crowd theory applies to complex questions too.340 A group 
of online gamers were able to solve a complex problem in AIDS 
research that had eluded scientists for years.341 A group of pro-
fessionals in many fields were able to find a submarine that 
had vanished without a trace.342 The crowd drafted an encyclo-
pedia that stacks up with the best in the world.343 Thus, ―com-
plexity is no bar‖ to the emergence of the wisdom of the 
crowd.344 Moreover, the ultimate question in crowdfunding in-
 
 335. Some commentators expect that crowdfunding investors will have only 
poor investments to choose from because no high-quality companies will 
choose to employ crowdfunding. E.g., Dorff, supra note 14, at 520. If these crit-
ics are correct, the only good decision for the crowd would be to abandon the 
market entirely, rather than try to pick among the offerings. Still, that would 
be a good decision and one that can be made with the help of the crowd. 
 336. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 241, at 524 (discussing the difficulty of 
concentrating statistical information in the hands of central planners). 
 337. See id. at 526 (describing how even diffuse information will eventually 
lead to the same outcome as if that information was held by one person). 
 338. See supra text accompanying note 323. 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 324–25. 
 340. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii. 
 341. Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral Prote-
ase Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL & MO-
LECULAR BIOLOGY 1175, 1177 (2011). 
 342. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xx. 
 343. Aniket Kittur & Robert E. Kraut, Harnessing the Wisdom of Crowds 
in Wikipedia: Quality Through Coordination, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 
ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 37, 45 
(2008) (―Wikipedia is both an existence proof and a model for how complex 
cognitive tasks with high coordination requirements can be effectively 
achieved through distributed methods.‖). 
 344. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at xvii. 
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vesting is binary—buy or pass—so while the considerations are 
complex, the ultimate answer is either zero or one. 
Certain aspects of the CROWDFUND Act are specifically 
designed to enhance the wisdom of the crowd effect. First, the 
Act provides that only those offerings that meet a predeter-
mined goal will actually get funded; for those that fall short, all 
the pledged investments will be nullified.345 Second, the Act 
gives investors the right to cancel a commitment to invest once 
made.346 The effect of both of these provisions will be that any 
individual investor who selects a ―bad‖—meaning unpopular—
investment will be saved from her poor choice by the wisdom of 
the crowd. She will not walk off the cliff alone, but will be 
pulled back to safety by the crowd. 
The wisdom of the crowd will benefit crowdfunding entre-
preneurs as well as investors. A startup that may appear un-
promising to venture capitalists, angel investors and other tra-
ditional sources of startup funding might catch the eye of a few 
members of the crowd. Due to the large size and heterogeneity 
of digital shareholders, ―the chances that at least someone will 
take a gamble on a radical or unlikely idea obviously increas-
es.‖347 There may be lots of welfare-enhancing companies that 
can grow through crowdfunding whose promise would only be 
recognized by a relatively few people who happen to hold the 
relevant information, and the odds are much greater to find 
them among the crowd rather than accredited investors. For 
example, a company that wanted to sell specialized cleats for 
ultimate would need to find those pockets of players who recog-
nize that this is an unmet consumer desire.348 
In conclusion, the wisdom of the crowd can help address 
both uncertainty and information asymmetry in the crowdfund-
ing context. 
B. CROWDSOURCED INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
Beyond the tacit collaboration of the wisdom of the crowd, 
potential investors can share what they know on the Internet 
for others to see, add to and comment upon. Using online cha-
 
 345. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7) (2012). 
 346. Id. This right is expressly implemented at 15 C.F.R. § 237.304(a) in 
the regulations. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,558 (proposed Nov. 15, 
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. 
§ 227.304(a)). 
 347. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 29. 
 348. See generally What is Ultimate?, USA ULTIMATE, http://www 
.usaultimate.org/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
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trooms, bulletin boards and the like, potential investors and 
others can directly communicate with one another and share 
material information about various crowdfunding invest-
ments.349 This type of crowdsourcing350 holds great promise as 
a response to uncertainty and information asymmetry in 
crowdfunding, and its use has been endorsed by the SEC.351 
Crowdsourcing is a voluntary online activity that ―leverag-
es the collective intelligence of online communities‖ to achieve a 
concrete result.352 Wikipedia is a crowdsourced encyclopedia 
that has proven about as reliable as other leading encyclopedi-
as.353 NASA uses crowdsourcing to sort through millions of pho-
tographs taken from space, on the theory that someone familiar 
with a given locale could easily identify it, whereas few others, 
nor computers, could readily do so.354 Other examples abound, 
including less formal structures like chat groups,355 email lists, 
blogs and other online communities where people gather and 
share information on a sports team, pet breed, or any other 
 
 349. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 12–13. This is analogous to the prac-
tice of syndication, or group investing, which allows VC investors to ―obtain 
each other‘s judgment with respect to particular investment opportunities.‖ 
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 56. 
 350. See generally BRABHAM, supra note 31; Jeff Howe, The Rise of 
Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176 (origin of the term). The present 
Article uses ―crowdsourcing‖ in a loose sense. See JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURC-
ING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 
280 (2008) (loosely defining crowdsourcing as ―an umbrella term for a highly 
varied group of approaches that share one obvious attribute in common: they 
all depend on some contribution from the crowd‖); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 385 n.2 (2013) (using the 
term in a ―loose manner‖). For instance, Yochai Benkler‘s concept of ―com-
mons-based peer production‖ comes within this Article‘s conception of 
crowdsourcing. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of 
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002). This is as opposed to the strict defini-
tions suggested by some in the literature which would exclude Wikipedia and 
other projects that are popularly conceived as crowdsourced. E.g., BRABHAM, 
supra note 31, at 2–3, 7–8 (expressly excluding Benkler‘s idea from a formal 
definition of crowdsourcing).  
 351. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,430 (describing the sharing of 
information as one of the ―central tenets‖ of crowdfunding). 
 352. BRABHAM, supra note 31, at xix.  
 353. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 
900, 901 (2005) (finding that Wikipedia is nearly as accurate as the Ency-
clopædia Britannica, at least with regard to scientific articles). 
 354. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Image Overload: Help Us Sort It All Out, 
NASA Requests, CNN (Aug. 18, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/ 
17/tech/nasa-earth-images-help-needed. 
 355. By this I mean an online bulletin board where people can post mes-
sages and reply to those previously posted. 
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subject.356 
These sorts of efforts translate well to crowdfunding. Just 
as thousands of people contribute to Wikipedia and perform 
other crowdsourced work for free, potential investors can inves-
tigate companies and share their findings with the crowd.357 
Difficult implementation questions need to be worked out, such 
as whether participants would have to register with their real 
names, or if anonymous posting would be allowed.358 
As for expertise, few potential investors will be experts in a 
formal sense,359 but some surely will. Among a large enough 
crowd, there is sure to be somebody with expertise in any given 
field, simply as a matter of numbers.360 Moreover, there are at 
least some companies that may seek to use crowdfunding that 
already have an online community of customers or users who 
are especially knowledgeable about that company.361 If any of 
these types of experts share their knowledge on the bulletin 
board, then the whole crowd can become well informed.362 
More important than formal expertise, however, is the idea 
that practically every member of the crowd knows something 
that others do not; something particular to their personal expe-
rience, skills, and perspective.363 Each of these distributed bits 
 
 356. See, e.g., THE BEST RAT TERRIER SITE ON THE WEB, http://www.rat 
-terrier.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 357. This already happens in related spaces, such as peer-to-peer lending. 
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2011). 
 358. Anonymity might enhance the accuracy of the discussion in some cas-
es, but it may also diminish it in others. See BRABHAM, supra note 31, at 13 
(―Anonymity is important for online collaboration, especially when people ex-
press ideas and opinions to a commons.‖). 
 359. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 360. See Dorff, supra note 14 (―Some crowdfunders may have relevant ex-
perience . . . .‖). 
 361. Nut-butter company, Justin‘s, for instance, has received over 120,000 
likes on Facebook. Justin’s, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
JustinsNutButter (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Presumably, many of these fans 
are intimately familiar with the company‘s products. See also Leslie Josephs, 
Nut-Butter Firm’s Founder Adjusts to Growth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2015, at 
B5 (reporting that early fundraisings for the company were on the order of 
$25,000 to $100,000, which would have been appropriate for securities crowd-
funding, had it existed at the time). 
 362. There is reason to expect that they will do so. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 364–88. 
 363. Hayek, supra note 241, at 519 (―[S]cientific knowledge is not the sum 
of all knowledge. . . . [T]here is beyond question [another] body of very im-
portant but unorganized knowledge[,] . . . the knowledge of the particular cir-
cumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every 
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of information standing alone may not be significant. But gath-
ered together, they constitute a sort of collective wisdom on just 
about any subject that may arise. 
Indeed, the SEC‘s Regulation Crowdfunding envisions 
crowdsourced investor research of this sort: ―Individuals inter-
ested in the crowdfunding campaign—members of the ‗crowd‘—
may share information about the project, cause, idea or busi-
ness with each other and use the information to decide whether 
or not to fund the campaign based on the collective ‗wisdom of 
the crowd.‘‖364 Moreover, the regulation specifically authorizes 
funding portals to ―[p]rovide communication channels by which 
investors can communicate with one another and with repre-
sentatives of the issuer through the funding portal‘s platform 
about offerings through the platform,‖ subject to certain condi-
tions, including public access.365 
But is this realistic? Why would someone with good infor-
mation about a given investment post it on a bulletin board and 
share it with other members of the crowd for free? Securities 
analysts and hedge funds, who play an analogous role for tradi-
tional public companies, tend keep their findings and opinions 
secret or share them only with a limited number of clients or 
other parties.366 
Apart from altruism, a desire for fame, or other nonpecuni-
ary reasons,367 is there an economic rationale for digital share-
holders to share information with one another? Yes there is, 
one that comes directly from the interplay of two components of 
 
individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique in-
formation of which beneficial use might be made . . . .‖). 
 364. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,429 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239–40, 249). This already happens with respect to publicly traded 
companies, as hedge funds and others use blogs, Twitter and other online fo-
rums to ―talk their book.‖ See, e.g., Steven Russolillo, The iCahn Effect: Apple’s 
Market Cap Jumps by $17 Billion After Tweets, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT 
(Aug. 13, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/13/the 
-icahn-effect-apples-market-cap-jumps-by-17-billion-after-tweets (―Activist in-
vestor Carl Icahn disclosed on Twitter Tuesday afternoon a ‗large position‘ in 
Apple Inc., the tech giant which he deemed ‗extremely undervalued.‘ . . . Apple 
shares jumped on the news, rising as much as 5.8%. . . . From the moment 
that Icahn tweeted through Tuesday‘s intraday high, Apple had gained $17.1 
billion in market value . . . .‖). 
 365. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,560. 
 366. See David Benoit, Hedge Funds Learn Secrets Not So Safe, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 26, 2015, at C1 (―In the hedge-fund world, there is no more closely 
guarded secret than what stock a firm is preparing to target.‖). 
 367. See generally Schwartz, supra note 126 (describing the non-monetary 
rewards of participating in crowdfunding). 
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crowdfunding, at least as conceived by the federal JOBS Act. 
First, each crowdfunding investor faces an annual cap of 
5% of their income or net worth in all crowdfunded securities 
each year.368 For most Americans, this works out to be some-
where between $2500 and $5000 per year in all crowdfunded 
investments.369 Second, crowdfunding companies must an-
nounce their fundraising goal in advance and will only receive 
the money if they reach or exceed that goal.370 
The combined effect of these two rules is that a potential 
investor who spots a great opportunity has a powerful economic 
incentive to share her views widely. The investment cap pre-
vents a single investor from funding a company on her own.371 
If she keeps her information secret and the company does not 
catch the attention of other investors, it will not reach its goal 
and no securities will be sold. By contrast, if such an investor 
shares her information on the Internet, it is more likely that 
the issuer will reach its goal and she will get the securities she 
wants. In short, crowdfunding promotes cooperation. Those 
with valuable information about crowdfunding companies have 
a powerful incentive to give that information away, including 
on an Internet bulletin board.372 
Furthermore, reputation feedback systems of the sort dis-
cussed in the next Section could enhance the efficacy of 
 
 368. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). Wealthy investors can invest up to 
10%. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii). 
 369. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1461. 
 370. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(7). 
 371. There are extreme circumstances where this might not hold and a sin-
gle investor could fund an entire issuance. Because the CROWDFUND Act al-
lows those with an income or net worth over $100,000 to invest 10%, up to an 
absolute limit of $100,000, there is the possibility that a single person could 
buy up a huge chunk, even 100%, of the crowdfunded securities from a given 
company. This appears to be an unlikely scenario. 
 372. A similar sort of platform, called SumZero, already exists for profes-
sional investment analysts to share their proprietary investment reports with 
one another in an online forum. See About SumZero, SUMZERO, https:// 
sumzero.com/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (claiming to have ―more than 
12,000 pre-screened professionals‖); Sum of Its Parts: Web Site Combines Idea 
Database, Networking, FINALTERNATIVES (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www 
.finalternatives.com/node/7348 (―A new Web site is seeking to combine two of 
the more revolutionary and successful ideas in recent Internet history, Wik-
ipedia and social networking, for the benefit of the buyside community.‖). A 
key difference between SumZero and crowdsourced investment analysis is that 
the former is an exclusive network only open to professionals whose applica-
tions are accepted, whereas crowdsourced investment analysis for crowdfund-
ing will be open to all. 
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crowdsourced investment analysis.373 Commenters could re-
ceive votes and build up reputations for the value of their com-
ments, which would improve the system.374 
One potential problem with crowdsourced investment in-
formation is that it might give rise to market manipulation. For 
instance, the issuer could ask a friend (or set of friends) to post 
false information in order to obtain the initial investment. 
Simple fraud like this is surely possible, but it seems unlikely 
to develop into a major problem because the gravity of the con-
sequences and the chances of detection are both relatively high, 
while the potential returns are rather modest. The CROWD-
FUND Act has powerful anti-fraud provisions,375 and it also 
empowers state authorities as well as jilted investors376 to sue 
issuers and other parties who engage in wrongdoing such as 
this. Furthermore, everyone who posts information will be 
logged in, making it a cinch to track down who said what. Giv-
en all this, it seems that issuers with fraudulent intentions 
would have better luck elsewhere. 
Manipulation by third parties in the secondary market will 
be even less of a concern. Consider the example of the pump-
and-dump scheme where stockholders circulate market-moving 
but false information to drive up the price of their shares, and 
then sell and book profits before the truth comes out. Such ma-
nipulation requires a secondary market of substantial size to 
make it worthwhile, but that will not generally be the case for 
crowdfunded companies. For one thing, the JOBS Act expressly 
prohibits a secondary market for a year after issuance.377 Even 
after that, the number of shares available will generally be too 
small to make practical a secondary market.378 
 
 373. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 374. SumZero explicitly incorporates the concept of reputation. See About 
SumZero, supra note 372 (―[T]he platform . . . enables members to build a 
track record . . . .‖). 
 375. The regulations contemplate incorporating already-existing anti-fraud 
measures and requires intermediaries to comply with specific, additional 
measures. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,556 (proposed Nov. 5, 
2013) (notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. 
§ 227.301). 
 376. State regulators can disqualify issuers for misconduct, id. at 66,562, 
and the statute includes a private right of action, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012). 
 377. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e). 
 378. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1463 (―[A]s a practical matter there will 
be a very small secondary market for any given crowdfunded security.‖); id. 
(―[N]o liquid secondary market is likely to develop in crowdfunded securi-
ties.‖). 
SCHWARTZ_4fmt 1/3/2016 12:57 PM 
668 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:609 
 
Finally, putting intentional manipulation aside, there is 
also the possibility that, instead of being wise and thoughtful, 
the crowd could act with a mob or herd mentality of the sort 
that has led to asset bubbles from the Dutch Tulips of the sev-
enteenth century to the housing bubble of our own. By com-
municating with one another on the Internet, the crowd could 
suffer from ―groupthink‖ thanks to issues like anchoring379 or 
information cascades.380 Anyone who has ever chosen a restau-
rant simply because it is crowded understands the concept of 
an information cascade. The restaurant might be crowded be-
cause it is high quality; alternatively, it might be low-quality 
and the initial diners simply made a mistake that many others 
followed.381 
Anchoring and information cascades like this could under-
mine the effectiveness of crowdsourcing investor information. 
For instance, if enough people on an Internet chat board seem 
to think the investment is a good one, others might latch on to 
the popularity of that view and adopt it as their own, regard-
less of its underlying merit. This ―lemming problem‖382 can al-
ready be observed in reward crowdfunding, where popular pro-
jects appear to take off once they hit a certain level of 
funding.383 
Fortunately, there is good reason to think that anchoring 
and information cascades will not be fatal in the context of 
crowdfunding because investors are likely to feel and act inde-
pendent from one another. Research shows that groups of peo-
ple are ―far more likely to come up with a good decision if the 
people in the group are independent of each other.‖384 Inde-
pendence is important because ―it keeps the mistakes that peo-
 
 379. ―When people are asked to generate an estimate, they frequently an-
chor on an obvious or convenient number . . . and then adjust upward or 
downward . . . . This procedure naturally leads to estimations which are 
skewed toward the initial value.‖ Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 630, 667 (1999). 
 380. An information cascade is a herding-like effect where people disregard 
their own private information and adopt the popular view if they observe suf-
ficiently many other people taking that view. See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA 
88–91 (2006); SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 53–55. 
 381. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 54–55. 
 382. I credit Seth Oranburg with coining this term. 
 383. See Agrawal et al., supra note 222, at 13 (―[I]nvestors‘ propensity to 
invest in a given week increases as the entrepreneur visibly accumulates capi-
tal on the site.‖). 
 384. SUROWIECKI, supra note 114, at 41. 
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ple make from becoming correlated‖ and because ―independent 
individuals are more likely to have new information.‖385 
On crowdfunding websites, there will be no institutional 
investors to set the tone with their gravitas, and while accred-
ited investors will be invited, they will be on the same level as 
everyone else. Furthermore, people on the Internet tend to act 
individualistically and are willing to challenge one another.386 
Finally, the lack of face-to-face contact in crowdfunding may 
reduce the likelihood of the sort of mimicry that is found among 
groups of animals and people.387 None of this ensures that 
members of the crowd will act independently from one anoth-
er,388 but it does enhance that possibility. 
In sum, crowdsourced investor information is a promising 
method for crowdfunding to address the fundamental problems 
of uncertainty and information asymmetry, yet anchoring and 
information cascades may hinder this mechanism. 
C. ONLINE REPUTATION 
The online reputation of founders, promoters, and manag-
ers of crowdfunded companies can be used to address both in-
formation asymmetry and agency costs in a manner well suited 
to crowdfunding‘s institutional context. Insiders can signal to 
investors that they are committed to and believe in the compa-
ny by putting their online reputation on the line by, for in-
stance, linking to their Facebook or other social media page on 
their crowdfunding campaign.389 This reduces information 
asymmetry. Furthermore, by putting their online reputation in 
play, insiders can provide a bond—a credible promise—that 
agency costs will be modest (i.e., they will work diligently and 
faithfully for the investors‘ benefit). 
Reputation is a summary or representation of society‘s 
opinion of an individual or organization.390 Once such infor-
 
 385. Id. 
 386. See id. at 42. 
 387. See id. at 43 (describing a psychology experiment involving a group of 
people on a street corner looking up at nothing). 
 388. In particular, if certain members of the crowd are perceived as ex-
perts, see supra Part IV.B, others may follow their advice rather than render-
ing an independent analysis. 
 389. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1472 (―There is every reason to believe 
that crowdfunding issuers and intermediaries can and will use Facebook or 
other types of social media to promote their offerings to a wide audience at low 
cost.‖). 
 390. See LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 31 (2007); 
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mation is aggregated, reputations ―can help other community 
members make decisions with respect to whether and how to 
relate to that individual,‖ such as whether to trust them.391 In 
this way, reputations ―create[] powerful incentives for good be-
havior.‖392 Furthermore, the Internet is well suited to keeping 
careful track of one‘s reputation.393 The upshot is that online 
reputation represents a promising method for addressing in-
formation asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding 
context. 
Reputation is extremely useful in enabling successful in-
teractions between transacting parties, such as buyers and 
sellers.394 The existence of a reputation ―informs others about 
[a seller‘s] abilities and dispositions,‖ and can be used to select 
trustworthy counterparties.395 Reputation can also be a power-
ful disincentive for bad behavior. Since a good reputation ena-
bles business transactions, it is implicit that a bad reputation 
would discourage business transactions.396 ―By ensuring that 
people are accountable for their actions, reputation gives people 
a strong incentive to conform to social norms and to avoid 
breaching people‘s trust.‖397 This is why sellers care about hav-
ing a good reputation. Thanks to reputational constraints, 
―both individuals and organizations feel a lot of pressure to fol-
low the group norms.‖398 In this way, reputation encourages 
good behavior.399 
In the context of crowdfunding, where all transactions will 
take place on the Internet, online reputation will likely prove to 
be an important way to address information asymmetry and 
 
Chris Stiff, Are They Bothered? How the Opportunity To Damage a Partner’s 
Reputation Influences Giving Behavior in a Trust Game, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
609, 610 (2008) (defining reputation as ―an aggregation of socially shared in-
formation regarding a potential interaction partner‖). 
 391. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social 
Web, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY 4 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., 
2011); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 31 (2007). 
 392. Gail L. Rein, A Reference Model for Designing Effective Reputation In-
formation Systems, 31 J. INFO. SCI. 365, 365 (2005). 
 393. See id. at 375 (―Time Stamp records the precise time (year, month, 
day, minute, and second) of the reputation rating.‖). 
 394. See id. at 365. 
 395. Id. at 365–66. 
 396. See SOLOVE, supra note 391. 
 397. Id. at 32; see id. at 31 (―In many circumstances, we look to people‘s 
reputation to decide whether to trust them.‖). 
 398. BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS 9 (2012). 
 399. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 8 
(2013). 
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agency costs. Scholars of privacy law have shown that living in 
the Internet age makes it effectively impossible to remain 
anonymous, which is itself a key factor in allowing for misbe-
havior.400 For example, studies have shown that drivers engage 
in more misbehavior on the road when they feel anonymous401: 
Drivers of convertibles drive less aggressively when they have 
the top down;402 commercial drivers with ―How‘s My Driving?‖ 
stickers drive much more safely than those without.403 
Internet-based securities crowdfunding will not be anony-
mous,404 making the institutional context of crowdfunding very 
different from the conditions that led the enactment of state 
Blue Sky Laws in the early 1900s and the federal securities 
laws in the 1930s, when aggressive salesmen and con artists 
roamed the land.405 These men used aliases and tended to ―fly 
by night‖ from one town to the next, making reputation an inef-
fective means of constraining their behavior.406 
With regard to securities crowdfunding, the social circum-
stances are very different. Entrepreneurs, investors, and man-
agement will all be identifiable, for it is the nature of the Inter-
net that all parties must create a user name and password, link 
a bank account, etc., before transacting business online,407 
 
 400. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 33 (―No longer can people hide in ob-
scurity and escape accountability for their actions.‖); id. (―The Internet . . . 
makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades. It is avail-
able around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a 
second.‖). 
 401. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and 
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1705 (2006). 
 402. See id. at 1705–06 n.13. 
 403. See id. at 1711. 
 404. While some online marketplaces or activities may be anonymous, In-
ternet-based securities crowdfunding will not be. Investors will be required to 
link banking and other financial information to their online account. 
 405. See generally DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE 
CONFIDENCE MAN (1940) (documenting the practices of American con artists 
in the early 1900s); AMY READING, THE MARK INSIDE: A PERFECT SWINDLE, A 
CUNNING REVENGE, AND A SMALL HISTORY OF THE BIG CON (2012) (presenting 
a history of con artist crime in the early 1900s); THE SECURITY MARKETS: 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY FUND 566–69 (Alfred L. Bernheim & Margaret Grant Schneider 
eds., 1935) (explaining how the problems posed by dishonest securities traders 
instigated securities laws in the early 1930s). 
 406. See SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 141 (―When people can avoid being 
identified, they can slip away from their bad reputations.‖). 
 407. Cf. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,560 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(notice of final rule released Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 227.402(b)(4)(iii)) (requiring that participants in online chatrooms register 
with the hosting portal). In contrast, other online marketplaces, such as 
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thereby allowing every action and utterance to be monitored 
and tracked.408 Even sophisticated Internet users who take 
pains to anonymize and conceal their activity can generally be 
found by determined detectives.409 The indelible data trail tying 
a person to their online activity will give rise to an important 
method for ameliorating information asymmetry and agency 
costs by placing the online reputation of the promoters, direc-
tors and executives at stake.410 
Online reputation will act as a signal of good companies as 
well as a bonding mechanism to help ensure hard work and fi-
delity from the managers.411 With their personal reputation on 
the line, managers of crowdfunded companies will have a 
strong incentive to act in the shareholders‘ interest. This is 
analogous to the traditional requirement that the incorporators 
be listed on the certificate of incorporation,412 thus allowing po-
tential investors to see who is behind the company (and whose 
reputation should suffer if the company squanders their in-
vestments). This may have made sense when investors and di-
rectors knew each other from face-to-face interaction, but in the 
modern world people earn and maintain their reputation 
through their online presence. 
This can all be seen as one instance of a larger ―reputation 
revolution‖ whereby ―the anonymity and pseudonymity that 
once characterized our interactions with strangers is fading.‖413 
This revolution is playing out in many spheres, including con-
 
craigslist, may be more prone to fraud and other forms of misbehavior because 
they permit anonymous communications with no clear link to a real person, 
physical address, bank account, etc. 
 408. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 131 (1999) (explaining 
that by ―using credit cards and checks (as opposed to paying cash) and [by] or-
dering merchandise over the phone and the Internet (rather than shopping in 
person),‖ people ―leave data trails that are difficult to erase or conceal‖). 
 409. See Matthew Dalton & Andrew Grossman, Arrests Signal Breach in 
“Darknet,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 8–9, 2014, at B1 (reporting that law enforcement 
authorities ―shut dozens of illegal websites and arrested some operators‖ by 
―piercing the anonymity offered by Tor, a network that relies on encryption 
tools and 1,000s of servers to mask online activities‖). 
 410. But see Hurt, supra note 16, at 252 (―‗[L]eaving town‘ with fools‘ mon-
ey is easier when there is no town.‖). 
 411. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 153 (defining all efforts 
to address agency costs as either monitoring by principals or bonding by 
agents). 
 412. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(5) (2015) (mandating that a cer-
tificate of incorporation must include the ―name and mailing address of the 
incorporator or incorporators‖). 
 413. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiqui-
tous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1670–71 (2008). 
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sumer contracting,414 and the ideas presented here are in ac-
cord with this larger phenomenon. One manifestation of this 
phenomenon is the suggestion that there be a ―right to be for-
gotten‖ on the Internet, which has been recognized in Europe 
but pointedly denied in the United States.415 
On the whole, online reputation should work well to ad-
dress information asymmetry and agency costs in the crowd-
funding context. There are limits, however, including an inabil-
ity of the crowd to detect shirking that does not lead to 
disastrous results. If the company does fine, but could have 
done great, the entrepreneur is unlikely to pay a reputational 
fine. As such, reputation may be more effective at addressing 
malfeasance than slacking. 
Online reputation can be thought of in two senses, informal 
and formal. The former refers to the amalgamation of all Inter-
net references to a person, including blog posts, social media, 
and everything else. The latter refers to reputation feedback 
systems, such as the ―star‖ ratings used on Amazon and eBay. 
The role that each type of online reputation may play in reduc-
ing information asymmetry and agency costs in crowdfunding 
is considered in the following two subsections. 
1. Disaggregated Online Reputation416 
The management of crowdfunded companies can be disci-
plined by the prospect that if they shirk, provide themselves 
with excessive compensation, or otherwise impose agency costs 
on their investors, they will be pilloried in the ―blogosphere‖ 
and their online reputation will suffer.417 The management of 
 
 414. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: 
The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 702 (2012) (citing 
Strahilevitz, supra note 401, and Strahilevitz, supra note 413). 
 415. Compare Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Pro-
tección de Datos, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, at 88 (May 13, 2014) (Court of 
Justice of the European Union recognizing a ―right to be forgotten‖), with Mi-
chael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be Forgot-
ten To Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 355 (2015) 
(explaining that the European Union‘s ―right to be forgotten‖ has ―failed to de-
velop under United States law‖ because it is ―antithetical to the First Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution‖). 
 416. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY 
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (exploring and discussing the 
implications of emerging online technologies on privacy and public profile). 
 417. Cf. Hamermesh & Tsoflias, supra note 130, at 485 (―[I]f you commit 
fraud on [an online investment portal], your whole social network is going to 
know about it. Your future employers will know about it when they check your 
Facebook page. That cute girl you met in the bar is going to know about it 
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crowdfunding companies will be relatively easy to track down 
because all activity will take place on the Internet, where they 
will create a digital record and a trail to their door.418 The pro-
spect of a sullied online reputation can help reduce the agency 
costs of crowdfunding by disciplining management to act in the 
shareholders‘ interest. This sort of discipline already takes 
place in public markets, where activist shareholders employ so-
cial media to criticize and influence corporate management.419 
More relevant for present purposes, online reputation is 
widely used to discipline people who engage in reward crowd-
funding.420 Kickstarter specifically warns users that 
―[l]aunching a Kickstarter is a very public act, and creators put 
their reputations at risk when they do.‖421 In one recent case, 
apparel company Radiate Athletics raised substantial funds on 
Kickstarter but then was overwhelmed by orders and fell badly 
behind schedule, leading many disappointed patrons to com-
plain on the Internet.422 ―The problem mushroomed into a pub-
lic relations fiasco after angry Kickstarter backers, [sic] posted 
complaints on Facebook, Twitter and other websites. In the 
past 30 days alone, nearly 250 messages about Radiate have 
been posted on Twitter, nearly all complaints . . . .‖423 
Moreover, it seems likely that some promoters of crowd-
funding companies will provide hyperlinks in their offering to 
their Facebook, LinkedIn or other social media account as both 
a signal and a bonding mechanism. Such a hyperlink effectively 
says to investors, ―You can trust and expect that I will act re-
sponsibly with your investment, because the good name of my 
digital persona hangs in the balance.‖ This method of linking to 
social media is already used in reward crowdfunding; on Indie-
gogo, for instance, people seeking funding can obtain a ―Veri-
 
when you and she ‗friend‘ each other on Facebook. Your entire life on Face-
book, which occurs in public, is now linked to your securities offering.‖ (quot-
ing Professor Robert Miller)). 
 418. See id. 
 419. See Kristyn Hyland, Activist Investors Increasingly Use Social Media 
To Further Their Causes, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Oct. 31, 2014), http:// 
www.bna.com/activist-investors-increasingly-n17179910807. 
 420. See, e.g., Angus Loten, Kickstarter Push Overwhelms Entrepreneur, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2014, at B5 (reporting about how an entrepreneur‘s 
reputation suffered after he was unable to give promised rewards to his Kick-
starter investors). 
 421. Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/ 
faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 422. Loten, supra note 420. 
 423. Id. 
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fied Facebook Badge‖ by linking their Facebook and Indiegogo 
account.424 The purpose, according to Indiegogo, is to reduce in-
formation asymmetry: ―We think it‘s useful to have information 
that you may find helpful as you decide who to interact with on 
Indiegogo. . . . These additional pieces of information can help 
inform contributors‘ decisions about contributing to a campaign 
on Indiegogo.‖425 
It is certainly true, as some privacy scholars emphasize, 
that there are downsides to this method of addressing the three 
problems of investing.426 Their valid concerns over so-called 
―Internet shaming‖ include a lack of due process and the pro-
spect of vigilantism.427 Yet even critics acknowledge that ―In-
ternet shaming has many benefits,‖ and are apparently most 
opposed to the practice when it is used for violations of 
norms.428 Yet in crowdfunding, legal obligations such as fiduci-
ary duties and contractual covenants will be at stake. 
2. Reputation Feedback Systems 
Separate from the broad Internet-wide reputation of a per-
son, digital shareholders may benefit from a crowdfunding-
specific ―reputation feedback system,‖ akin to the star system 
used on eBay or Amazon.429 A reputation feedback system is an 
online mechanism where ―users of a network provide feedback 
about the performance of other network members‖ that is com-
piled and presented for the benefit of future users.430 Reputa-
tion feedback systems are crucial to the functioning of online 
marketplaces and may even be ―among the most important 
forms of social production to emerge in the last decade.‖431 
Most reputation feedback systems use what are called 
―Likert-type‖ scales.432 Such scales allow respondents to rate 
 
 424. About Verifications, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en 
-us/articles/202179638-About-Verifications (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 425. Id. 
 426. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 391, at 94–102 (identifying some 
problems posed by Internet shaming). 
 427. See id. at 96–101. 
 428. See id. at 92. 
 429. See, e.g., About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, AMAZON, http:// 
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=537806 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2015). 
 430. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUC-
TION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 131 (2007). 
 431. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 
1506 (2007). 
 432. Dawn G. Gregg, Outline Reputation Scores: How Well Are They Un-
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their experience on a discrete scale (e.g., rating a seller one, 
two, or three).433 Reputation feedback systems then aggregate 
these ratings in some way and publicize the result.434 Many 
reputation feedback systems display textual comments as 
well.435 
Reputation feedback systems translate the benefits of rep-
utation in traditional marketplaces to online marketplaces. 
Thus, they perform three main functions: they encourage con-
sumers to partake in internet transactions despite risk and the 
possibility of fraud, they decrease the risk and likelihood of 
fraud associated with anonymous interactions, and they allow 
consumers to have trust not only in their specific business 
partner, but also in the marketplace as a whole. Since reputa-
tion feedback systems help consumers decide whom to trust in 
online market places, consumers would theoretically avoid 
those sellers which were more likely to put them at risk based 
on their past behavior. As a result, sellers would try to avoid 
having a bad reputation in these feedback systems so as to 
avoid not being able to do business. 
The reputation feedback systems currently in use can be 
adapted for use in the crowdfunding arena.436 For instance, in-
vestors could be asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the 
investment with one to five ―stars‖ at launch and, perhaps, an-
nually thereafter. Over time, companies with low scores will 
find it hard to garner interest from the crowd for future rounds 
of fundraising. This all has the beneficial effect of encouraging 
good behavior by managers, and some level of monitoring by 
portals.437 Moreover, systems like these have extremely low 
costs—a key concern for crowdfunding—especially because they 
can be easily scaled. Finally, the SEC appears to have authori-
ty under the JOBS Act to require or recommend the use of rep-
utation feedback systems as a way to protect investors.438 
A linchpin of reputation feedback systems is having repeat 
players.439 They work well on eBay or Amazon, where sellers 
 
derstood?, 50 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS. 90, 91 (2009). 
 433. See id. 
 434. See id. 
 435. See About Comments, Feedback, & Ratings, supra note 429. 
 436. See Tomboc, supra note 14, at 270. 
 437. The system is not perfect, of course, as many crowdfunding companies 
will not have any future rounds of fundraising. In particular, the most prob-
lematic companies may never be heard from again. 
 438. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a) (2012). 
 439. See generally Gilson, supra note 17, at 1086 (stating that anticipating 
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make many sales and want to maintain a high reputation score 
to ensure future business. But many, perhaps most, crowdfund-
ing companies will be one-time players, seeking funding just 
once and never returning to the crowdfunding market. For such 
companies, a reputation feedback system will likely not be of 
much use, at least not beyond the broad reputation effects dis-
cussed in the previous subsection. 
There is, however, at least one repeat player in the crowd-
funding marketplace: the funding portals and broker-dealers 
through which every transaction must be made. These inter-
mediaries want investors to have a good experience so they will 
return to invest again on their website, making them sensitive 
to a reputation feedback system. A funding portal with lots of 
poorly rated companies will find it difficult to attract future us-
ers to its site. Importantly, this appears to be an effective con-
straint for existing reward crowdfunding sites, such as Indie-
gogo, which take care to avoid having their markets overrun by 
malfeasance.440 A reputation feedback system that allowed for 
comparison between platforms could play a useful role in ad-
dressing the agency costs of crowdfunding, but the simple flow 
of business may be sufficient even without such a system. 
Finally, another set of repeat players is the entrepreneurs 
and promoters behind the startups seeking funding. An entre-
preneur that successfully finances one startup through crowd-
funding may well be back months or years later to seek funding 
for another startup. This phenomenon of serial entrepreneur-
ship is common in the context of VC and angel investing,441 and 
if it were to carry over to crowdfunding there would exist a set 
of people who are repeat players with a strong interest in main-
taining a good online reputation. 
To summarize this Section, the importance in the modern 
world of maintaining a good online reputation can be used to 
reduce both information asymmetry and agency costs in crowd-
funding. 
 
repeated future transactions is an attribute in the operation of reputation 
markets). 
 440. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 441. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs 
and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2312 (2005) 
(―The owner-operator‘s human capital is not tied to any particular business 
enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities outside the existing enter-
prise are more attractive than those inside, which is precisely why most en-
trepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs.‖). 
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D. SECURITIES-BASED COMPENSATION 
Although it is sometimes called ―equity crowdfunding,‖ 
startups will be allowed to sell any type of security they wish, 
not just equity or common stock.442 Furthermore, there is good 
reason to expect that many crowdfunding companies will sell a 
variety of other types of securities, including unusual variants 
that will be unfamiliar to potential investors, such as ―unequi-
ty‖443 or ―safe.‖444 
The use of strange securities will create information 
asymmetry because the entrepreneur will generally understand 
the security she is selling much better than will the digital 
shareholders considering buying it. This information asym-
metry could be a significant hurdle for entrepreneurs to over-
come, as the investors will be understandably skeptical of buy-
ing a security that is something other than common stock. 
To overcome this information asymmetry, crowdfunding 
entrepreneurs can accept as managerial compensation the 
same security that is for sale to the crowd. By committing her-
self to being paid primarily with the precise security being of-
fered, an entrepreneur can assure the crowd that the security is 
worth buying. A promise of this sort to ―eat its own cooking‖ 
should help reduce information asymmetry and help crowd-
funding function.445 It must be acknowledged, however, that 
the literature on executive compensation shows how challeng-
ing it is to design an effective system.446 Even so, this technique 
would appear to help crowdfunding address the fundamental 
problem of information asymmetry. 
This idea of securities-based compensation is novel but 
closely related to the equity-based compensation used in VC 
companies. What is different here is that management is com-
pensated using the very same security sold to investors. In VC, 
the investors buy convertible preferred stock and the entrepre-
neur is paid in straight common stock. Here, both the digital 
shareholders and the entrepreneur/manager will receive the 
same security, of whatever type. 
 
 442. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1482. 
 443. Heminway, supra note 211. 
 444. Here, ―safe‖ is an acronym for ―simple agreement for future equity.‖ 
Startup Documents, YCOMBINATOR.COM (Mar. 2015), https://www.ycombinator 
.com/documents. 
 445. The potential tax implications for this form of compensation are be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
 446. See generally supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text. 
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E. DIGITAL MONITORING 
It is well known that information asymmetry and agency 
costs can be reduced if the principal monitors the agent. Moni-
toring is used by angels (who actively participate in the busi-
ness),447 VCs (who sit on the board),448 and public shareholders 
(who have access to voluminous disclosure)449 to address these 
problems, but these traditional methods of monitoring will not 
translate to crowdfunding.450 Even if they did, these techniques 
are far too costly for digital shareholders with only hundreds of 
dollars at stake to use. The Internet allows for extremely inex-
pensive monitoring, however, meaning that digital sharehold-
ers can employ high-tech but low-cost methods to monitor the 
management of the companies in which they invest. 
In the analog world, most investor monitoring of manage-
ment was expensive and time consuming. An investor that vis-
ited the company‘s office on a typical workday would surely 
learn valuable information, such as how many hours people 
spend at work, and the mere specter of such a visit would help 
reduce agency costs. But flying across the country to pay a per-
sonal visit is a very costly proposition. Similarly, many public 
shareholders would surely value attending a public company‘s 
annual meeting, but almost none actually show up because of 
the time and expense of doing so.451 
In the digital world, by contrast, investor monitoring can 
be accomplished at exceedingly low cost. Relevant business in-
formation, such as sales or customers, can be posted to a web-
site in real time.452 Managers can conduct regular telepresence 
meetings with investors using technologies such as Google Chat 
and Apple FaceTime that allow for real-time multi-point com-
munication. Employees could electronically clock in and out 
 
 447. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 448. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 449. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 450. See supra Part III. 
 451. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 838–39 (2013). 
 452. This concept goes beyond crowdfunding and may be applied to ordi-
nary public companies. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Is Not a Crime, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2015, at A9 (―[T]his is the time to use technology to lib-
erate information [regarding public company performance because] companies 
increasingly are able to track sales, expenses and other key drivers in real 
time.‖); Andy Kessler, Instead of Attacking Insider Trading, Make Everyone an 
Insider, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, at A13 (suggesting that the SEC force pub-
lic companies to ―post product sales information more often—every day or even 
in real time‖). 
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when they arrive and depart from their workstations and this 
information could be continuously uploaded to a website avail-
able to investors or a webcam can be installed that live-streams 
a view of the office to the Internet.453 Investors can use tools 
like Google‘s ―Street View‖ feature to take a look around the 
neighborhood, even from a thousand miles away.454 Many other 
examples could be given, and new ones will be developed that 
are not even conceivable at this time. The key point is that all 
of these digital monitoring techniques cost next to nothing to 
implement.455 
The power of digital monitoring is analogous to urban bicy-
cle-sharing programs.456 Bike sharing originated in European 
cities in the 1960s.457 These early systems were free and anon-
ymous; there was no record of who checked out which bike, 
making it impossible to monitor their behavior.458 These early 
systems failed because the bicycles were promptly stolen or de-
 
 453. For example, the design firm Sagmeister & Walsh presently has a live 
webcam filming the office at all times. See SAGMEISTER & WALSH, http://www 
.sagmeisterwalsh.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Depending on the type of 
business, however, a webcam may give a distorted view of effort, for instance if 
employees spend productive hours off-site. Also, one might question whether 
digital shareholders with small investments will be willing to sit and watch 
hours of video streams. Experience shows, however, that people are willing to 
engage in such crowdsourced activities well beyond what a strict understand-
ing of economic rationality might suggest. See, e.g., GALAXY ZOO, 
http://www.galaxyzoo.org/#/story (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (describing a 
crowdsourced astronomy project involving more than 150,000 volunteers who 
collectively contributed ―more than 50 million classifications [of galaxies]‖). 
 454. For one thing, Street View makes it difficult to pass off a vacant lot as 
an operating business, as would have been possible in the pre-digital age. See, 
e.g., Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 145–46 (Tex. 1931) (find-
ing fraud by a seller who claimed that a certain lot had a ―brick dwelling 
house‖ upon it when in fact it was a vacant). 
 455. This refers to direct costs to implement. If, for example, competitors 
can use the monitoring system to wrest an advantage from the issuer, that 
would clearly count as a cost of the system. However, it seems that manage-
ment would be cognizant of this possibility and arrange any monitoring sys-
tem so that it provides no assistance to competitors. This may limit to some 
extent the utility of the monitoring system but such a trade-off must be made. 
 456. Bike Sharing, PEDESTRIAN & BICYCLE INFO. CTR., http://www 
.pedbikeinfo.org/programs/promote_bikeshare.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
(―Bike sharing is an innovative transportation program, ideal for short dis-
tance point-to-point trips providing users the ability to pick up a bicycle at any 
self-serve bike-station and return it to any other bike station located within 
the system‘s service area.‖). 
 457. See Susan A. Shaheen et al., Bikesharing in Europe, the Americas, and 
Asia, 2143 TRANSP. RES. REC. 159, 160 (2010). 
 458. Id. 
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stroyed,459 as might have been expected with no way to place 
responsibility for a given bike on a specific person. Even as late 
as the 1990s, free and anonymous bike sharing systems were 
launched in cities including Cambridge in the United Kingdom 
(1993) and Boulder, Colorado (1995). In each case the systems 
were cancelled due to bike theft.460  
In the 2000s, however, bike-sharing has become a well-
functioning phenomenon in many cities around the world, in-
cluding Paris, New York, and Washington, D.C.461 What 
changed from the 1990s to the 2000s? A revolution in infor-
mation technology that allowed for effective and inexpensive 
monitoring of bike-sharers. Bike-share system designers 
learned from experience that ―user anonymity created a system 
that was prone to bicycle theft,‖ and responded by introducing 
tech-based systems that require people to swipe their personal 
credit card (or electronic smartcard) to release a bike, thereby 
creating a digital tether between the renter and the bike.462 
This method ―records user identification information as well as 
bike usage (e.g., time, duration, location, kilometers). This im-
provement solved previous issues of user anonymity and facili-
tated bicycle tracking, which reduced bicycle theft and vandal-
ism.‖463 Thanks to this digital tracking, few bikes are lost or 
damaged and the systems now work well.464 This applies direct-
ly to crowdfunding, where everything will take place on the In-
ternet, thereby leaving a digital trail that can be easily moni-
tored and significantly reducing agency costs. 
Digital monitoring, although new and different, can be 
highly effective at addressing information asymmetry and 
agency costs, especially when combined with crowdsourcing.465 
Consider plagiarism. In the paper era, it would be very difficult 
 
 459. Id. (recounting the history of bike sharing and describing the 1965 
White Bike Plan in Amsterdam where the fifty white bikes ―were often stolen 
or damaged,‖ leading the Plan to ―fail[] soon after its launch‖). 
 460. Id. at 160–61 (contrasting the failures of programs in Cambridge, 
U.K., and Boulder, Colorado, with the rare success of a free and anonymous 
system in La Rochelle, France). 
 461. Boulder has a well-functioning system today. See BOULDER B-CYCLE, 
https://boulder.bcycle.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 462. Shaheen et al., supra note 457, at 165. 
 463. Id. 
 464. There is no indication that increased penalties or other variables de-
serve anywhere near as much credit as technological development. See gener-
ally id. at 165–66 (emphasizing the technological innovations that have fur-
thered the next generation of bike-sharing systems). 
 465. See supra Part IV.B. 
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to determine whether a given book or article was plagiarized, 
as it required a careful comparison of the two hard copies. In 
the digital age, by contrast, plagiarism is exceedingly easy to 
detect thanks to the availability of electronic methods such as 
the ―compare‖ function on Microsoft Word. This has led to 
many instances these days of high-profile authors being re-
vealed as plagiarists, including Senator John Walsh,466 scien-
tist Jane Goodall,467 German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg,468 and Harvard undergraduate Kaavya Viswana-
than,469 just to name a few. 
Consider the related issue of an author who tries to pass 
off a false memoir as a true account of her life. There was a 
time when it was difficult to know whether a memoir was true 
or false. In 1971, the book Go Ask Alice was presented as a real-
life diary of a teenage girl who gets in trouble with drugs.470 
Over the years, various people have questioned whether it was 
a real diary, but to this day no one seems to know for sure.471 In 
the Internet age, things are very different. Contrast Go Ask Al-
ice with the 2003 book, A Million Little Pieces, presented by au-
thor James Frey as a true account of his problems with alcohol 
and drugs.472 The book was endorsed by Oprah Winfrey and be-
came a best seller. Within weeks of hitting the top of the chart, 
it was debunked by online sleuths as a fabrication.473 
 
 466. See Jonathan Martin, Senator’s Thesis Turns Out To Be Remix of Oth-
ers’ Works, Uncited, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at A1. 
 467. See Steven Levingston, Portions of Goodall’s “Seeds” Were Lifted from 
Other Works, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2013, at C1. 
 468. See Tony Paterson, German Defence Minister Quits over PhD Plagia-
rism Scandal, INDEP. (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/europe/german-defence-minister-quits-over-phd-plagiarism-scandal 
-2229492.html. 
 469. See David Zhou, Student’s Novel Faces Plagiarism Controversy, HARV. 
CRIMSON (Apr. 23, 2006), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/4/23/ 
students-novel-faces-plagiarism-controversy-beditors. 
 470. BEATRICE SPARKS, GO ASK ALICE (1971). 
 471. See Context, Go Ask Alice, SPARKNOTES, https://www.sparknotes.com/ 
lit/goaskalice/context.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (raising but not resolving 
the question of authorship). 
 472. JAMES FREY, A MILLION LITTLE PIECES (2003). 
 473. See A Million Little Lies: Exposing James Frey’s Fiction Addiction, 
SMOKING GUN (Jan. 8, 2006, 5:43 PM), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/ 
documents/celebrity/million-little-lies. See generally Carol Memmott, Author’s 
“Love and Consequences” Memoir Untrue, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2008, at 2D; 
Neda Ulaby, “Tea” Debacle Reflects the Murky Waters of Memoirs, NPR (Apr. 
19, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/04/19/135541513/tea-debacle-reflects-the 
-murky-waters-of-memoirs (―[T]he noble old world of publishing has not yet 
adapted to a digital age—where fact-checking is sport and results spread 
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Beyond memoirs, many other examples exist of lies being 
revealed as such in the Internet age. Reporter Jayson Blair 
faked a number of news stories writing for the New York 
Times.474 NBC News anchor Brian Williams claimed for a dec-
ade that he was in a helicopter that came under fire while on 
assignment in Iraq; that story was debunked as false in 2015 
after military personnel who were there raised their doubts 
online.475 
The point is that modern Internet sleuthing creates a very 
different atmosphere than in the past when secrets stood a 
much better chance of being kept quiet. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
famously went his entire presidency without the American 
people seeing him in a wheelchair.476 Had he lived in a digital 
age, this would have been impossible. His condition would have 
immediately become common knowledge simply because secrets 
and lies are very hard to maintain in a digital age. 
Finally, one of the strengths of digital monitoring is that it 
can be amplified through crowdsourcing. Just as potential in-
vestors can crowdsource information before buying in,477 they 
can also crowdsource information after they have invested. 
Crowdsourced monitoring responds to the concern that each in-
vestor will lack the incentive to monitor because she has only a 
small amount at stake. By sharing the burden of monitoring 
among the entire crowd of digital shareholders, each person can 
contribute just a bit, but the collective effort can have a power-
ful effect. 
Crowdsourced monitoring could take place through a cha-
troom or website established by the company or the portal, but 
that is not necessarily the case.478 Furthermore, all the same 
 
smoking gun-style over the Internet.‖). Other examples of memoirs revealed to 
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ES (2008), NORMA KHOURI, HONOR LOST: LOVE AND DEATH IN MODERN-DAY 
JORDAN (2003), and DAVID OLIVER RELIN & GREG MORTENSON, THREE CUPS 
OF TEA (2006). Memmott, supra. 
 474. See Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at A1. 
 475. See Joe Flint, NBC News Anchor Williams Draws Criticism for False 
Tale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at B2. Williams was subsequently suspended 
for six months. Joe Flint, NBC Suspends “Nightly News” Anchor Brian Wil-
liams for Six Months, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2015, at A1. 
 476. See HUGH G. GALLAGHER, FDR‘S SPLENDID DECEPTION 88–105, 207–
16 (1985). 
 477. See supra Part IV.B. 
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arguments discussed in Part IV.B above apply here, but even 
more so because investors have rights to additional infor-
mation. For example, shareholders have the authority to re-
quest books and records from the corporation for any proper 
purpose.479 Hence, even if a company would prefer not to share 
information with the crowdfund investors, it may be forced to 
do so by a books-and-records request.480 A group of people 
working together and sharing information via an online chat 
group, especially armed with the power to demand books and 
records, can be a powerful force to ameliorate information 
asymmetry and agency costs in the crowdfunding context. 
In summary, digital monitoring will be a powerful means 
of addressing information asymmetry and especially agency 
costs in crowdfunding. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article claims that crowdfunding can overcome the 
three fundamental problems of entrepreneurial finance and 
succeed using digital methods that are different from those 
used by VCs, angel investors, or public companies. In doing so, 
it makes at least three novel contributions to the crowdfunding 
literature and corporate and securities law more generally. 
First, it describes the distinctive way in which the three fun-
damental problems of finance will express themselves in crowd-
funding‘s unique context.481 Second, it reviews the significant 
solutions to the trio of problems employed in the analogous con-
texts of VC, angel investing, and public companies, and deter-
mines their relevance for crowdfunding.482 Third, it introduces 
a set of new and promising digital methods to address the trio 
of problems in crowdfunding.483 The next step is simply to wait 
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and see what happens once the SEC finishes its work and 
crowdfunding commences. 
